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ARTICLE
A Contemporary Proposal For Reconciling the Free
Speech Clause With Curricular Values Inculcation
in the Public Schools
Susan H. Bitensky
"The Child is father of the Man;
And I could wish my days to be
Bound each to each by natural piety."
- William Wordsworth1
That we cannot be adults without first having been children
is, by nature, the human condition; that we are blessed with
Wordsworth's "natural piety" is far less certain. The world has seen
no great surplusage of piety or, more laically, moral conscience.
Barbaric historical phenomena such as slavery, the holocaust and
the murderous nationalism of the 1990s,2 as well as less horrific
travesties such as Watergate and insider trading, stand as grim
testaments that morality has hardly been a consistent feature of
history. Yet, as scarce a commodity as moral uprightness often
appears to be, and as dim as its prospects may seem for gaining
* Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law. B.A., Case Western Reserve University,
1971; J.D., University of Chicago Law School, 1974. The author is grateful to Bruce C.
Hafen, Kevin C. Kennedy, Robert A. McCormick, and R. George Wright for their com-
ments on previous drafts. The author also thanks Dr. Milton V. Kline for his comments
on a previous draft of Part II of this Article. Any errors in the Article are this author's
sole responsibility. The excellent research assistance of Mark P. Douma, Kristen R. Gross,
and Karen R. Maheu is much appreciated.
The author dedicates this Article to her father, the late Dr. Reuben Bitensky, who,
by his example no less than his word, taught those around him the value of human
dignity and compassion, and to her husband, Dr. Elliott L. Meyrowitz, who first acquaint-
ed the author with the notion that law can play a catalytic role in popular norm forma-
tion.
1 William Wordsworth, My Heart Leaps Up When I Behold, in MAGIC CASEMENTS
640-41 (George S. Carhart & Paul A. McGhee eds., The Macmillan Co. 1933).
2 For a description of the fratricidal nationalism that has recently plagued many
areas of the globe, see Kenneth Auchincloss, A Fratricidal Year, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993,
at 24-29.
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the day, Americans have long been preoccupied with and, periodi-
cally, quite agitated over the treatment of morality and values in
their children's education.' There is a rather touching optimism
in this preoccupation, as if the adult psyche cannot relinquish
hope that moral quality will prevail, in spite of the historical testa-
ments, if only the children can be properly taught.
This preoccupation is especially warranted now and demands
heightened attention in light not only of whole countries in
search of their respective identities after the end of the Cold War,
but also due to "accumulating evidence of a moral decline" per-
meating all levels of society within the United States during recent
years.4 Government officials, business leaders, and ordinary adults
have accepted rule-breaking and selfishness as a way of life in
increasing numbers.' Worse still, "general youth trends present a
darker picture";6 the nation's youth have exhibited a disturbing
tendency toward violence, vandalism, stealing, cheating, peer cruel-
ty and diminishing civic responsibility, among other antisocial and
amoral behaviors.7
While a common concern for children's moral education has
persisted even in an atmosphere where adults are not necessarily
setting the best example, there has hardly been a public consensus
on how to go about achieving, the next generations' moral im-
provement. This Article identifies the basic pedagogical conflict
that underlies much of the dissension and examines its manifes-
tation as a tension within American constitutional law under the
First Amendment's Free Speech Clause.8 Specifically, the Article
examines the pedagogical dilemma over whether children's moral
education, through elementary and secondary level curricula,
3 Kenneth L. Woodward, What Is Virtue?, NEWSWEEK, June 13, 1994, at 38. See infra
notes 21-22, 24-54, 121-283 and accompanying text.
4 THOMAS LICKONA, EDUCATING FOR CHARACTER: HOW OUR SCHOOLS CAN TEACH RE-
SPECT AND RESPONSIBILITY 12 (1991); Howard Fineman, The Virtuecrats, NEWSWEEK, June 13,
1994, at 31.
5 LICKONA, supra note 4, at 12.
6 Id. at 13.
7 Id. at 13-19. See also WILLIAM KILPATRICK, WHY JOHNNY CAN'T TELL RIGHT FROM
WRONG: MORAL ILLITERACY AND THE CASE FOR CHARACTER EDUCATION 14-15, 100 (1992)
(describing the high incidence of serious crimes perpetrated in public high schools and a
rise in teenage suicides, drug and alcohol use, and sexual activity); Melinda Henneberger
with Michael Marriott, For Some, Youthful Courting Has Become a Game of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES,
June 11, 1993, at Al, A14; Barbara Kantrowitz, Wild in the Streets, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2,
1993, at 40 (describing a national epidemic of teen violence).
8 The Free Speech Clause states that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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should be accomplished by inculcating selected values or, instead,
by teaching processes of reasoning about values while avoiding the
transmission of any definite moral content.9 The latter technique
has generally been spared accusations of constitutional infirmity"0
since it does not require that children consciously learn a pref-
erence for one value over another and, therefore, ostensibly leaves
students free to believe in and propound whatever moral code
they choose." Values inculcation, in contrast, does require that
children learn a preference for one value over another" and has
drawn criticism as potentially violating children's First Amendment
rights to believe in and express their own views."5 For those, like
this author, who conclude that values transmission is an indis-
pensable part of morals education at these stages of schooling, the
legal question arises as to whether values inculcation can satisfy
the mandate of the Free Speech Clause or whether the less peda-
gogically effective noninculcative approach, that conceives of the
school as an unbiased "marketplace of ideas,"" is the only consti-
tutional means of moral education.' 5
9 See infra notes 41-113 and accompanying text.
10 DAVID MOSHMAN, CHILDREN, EDUCATION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A
PSYCHOLEGAL ANALYSIS 164-65 (1989). Cf. Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the
"Pall of Orthodoxy": Value Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL L. REV. 15, 66-67, 72-
73 (assuming that value neutral education is consistent with free speech principles and
arguing that, therefore, schools should at least create the illusion that this type of educa-
tion is being provided); Nat Stem, Challenging Ideological Exclusion of Curriculum Material:
Rights of Students and Parents, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 485, 487 (1979) (positing that
the First Amendment tenet of maintaining society as a marketplace of ideas is applicable
to the nation's classrooms). But see P. George Wright, Free Speech Values, Public Schools, and
the Role of Judicial Deferencp, 22 NEw ENG. L. REV. 59, 74 (1987) (suggesting that insofar
as a value-neutral education or a marketplace of ideas school environment may leave
students "without any coherent standpoint at all," such pedagogical techniques may be
objectionable as resulting in studext's "free speech capacity impairment").
11 See infra notes 41-48, 50-51 and accompanying text.
12 See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 53-54, 161, 163-64, 170, 201-02 and accompanying text.
14 The "marketplace of ideas" metaphor became part of common legal discourse
after it was invoked by Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting and joined by Brandeis, J.). See
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 785-86 (2d ed. 1988)
(referring to Justice Holmes' Abrams dissent as the source of the metaphor in American
constitutional jurisprudence). The phrase has frequently been used to describe a peda-
gogical approach akin to values clarification or cognitive moral development, where all
relevant viewpoints are entertained with equal seriousness as part of the education pro-
cess. See infra text accompanying notes 41-48, 50-51.
15 See infra notes 114-361 and accompanying text. As a general matter, whenever gov-
emnment supports or promotes some speech but not other speech, the government's
action "can be analyzed under equal protection as well as first amendment principles." 4
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This Article takes the position that counterposing the
inculcative and noninculcative approaches as mutually exclusive
and irreconcilable options creates a false and educationally detri-
mental dichotomy. 6 Public elementary and secondary schools can
teach value preferences that are essential to the formation of a
moral human being and use reasoning as part of the inculcative
process; moreover, the inculcative function need not preclude the
schools from providing a marketplace of ideas in the sense of
exposing children to a broad range of conceptual and factual
material.1 7 Although this pedagogical approach involves values in-
culcation in a significant way, the premise of this Article is that
the inculcative element"8 will not violate the Free Speech Clause
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NoWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE § 20.11 (2d ed. 1992). The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause declares that "[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Thus, if the Court finds
that such governmental discrimination among speakers or would be speakers violates the
Free Speech Clause, it could also hold that the discrimination violates the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 4 NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra, § 20.11.
Yet, as Justice Rehnquist has aptly remarked, the schools are "the one public insti-
tution which, by its very nature, is a place for selective conveyance of ideas." Board of
Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 915 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The accuracy of these remarks is confirmed by even the rou-
tine decisions which schools must make in prescribing curriculum and textbooks. Steven
Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 568 (1980). In addition, as Part III of
this Article demonstrates, the Supreme Court has, in the final analysis, given the schools
considerable latitude under the Free Speech Clause to inculcate values in students. See
infra text accompanying notes 114-283. These circumstances make a requirement that
there be some "constitutional equality of status" as between the government as educator
and all other contending voices inappropriate at precollege levels. Shiffrin, supra, at 572,
578-79, 581. But see Tyll van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Governmental Au-
thority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX. L. REV. 197, 289-92 (1983) (rejecting the proposition
that public schools should inculcate values and arguing that inculcation should be sup-
planted by a "fairness principle" such that opposing views are presented to students). Due
to these considerations and because the precedent relevant to values inculcation has
arisen in relation to the Free Speech Clause rather than the Equal Protection Clause,
this Article is confined to analysis only under the former provision.
16 See infra notes 359-61 and accompanying text.
17 See infra note 361 and accompanying text.
18 It may be that, in this context, the term "inculcative" does not do justice to the
pedagogical model advocated by this author. The dictionary defines "inculcation" as the
pedagogical technique of "teach[ing] and impress[ing] by frequent repetitions or admoni-
tions." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 611 (9th ed. 1988). Values inculca-
tion, then, literally means the teaching and impressing of values upon students by fre-
quent repetitions or admonitions.
It is true that the educational model advanced here shares with the dictionary defi-
nition of values inculcation the same basic goal - imparting definite values preferences
to children. It is also true that both the suggested educational model and values inculca-
tion share the same pedagogical technique of requiring the teacher to express values
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if the values transmitted are those which will further the mainte-
nance of a civilized social order and promote democracy.19 The
Free Speech Clause will not be violated because such values tran-
scend. the status of debatable values and have effectively become
"ideational prerequisites" to collective human existence, analogous
to life's material prerequisites." Those values may be found in
the U.S. Constitution and other domestic laws. However, ideational
prerequisites find their fullest expression in international human
rights laws.
The Article is divided into four parts that elaborate and de-
velop these themes. Part I provides an historical backdrop of the
American morals education experience as it relates to the legal
system. Part II examines the nature of children's mental opera-
tions and describes the conflict among education and child psy-
chology experts over the most efficacious pedagogical techniques
for transmitting lessons in morality to elementary and secondary
school students. Part III identifies the jurisprudential counterpart
to this pedagogical conflict under the Free Speech Clause and
analyzes United States Supreme Court precedent pertinent to the
constitutionality of morals education under the clause. Finally, Part
IV proposes a solution to pedagogical and constitutional tensions
that would have public schools, in their curricula, provide for rea-
soned inculcation of ideational prerequisites at the elementary and
preferences to children. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77-80 (1979) (stating
that teachers inculcate values by presenting, explaining, and promoting values and by
serving as role models). However, the model envisions that the teacher's expression of a
values preference should be accompanied by rational and informed argumentation sup-
portive of the preference. Repetition and exhortation, if any, would play no more than a
secondary role.
Nevertheless, the phrase "values inculcation" and variations thereon will be used
throughout this Article in referring to the model of morals education proposed herein.
The reason for adhering toothis imprecise usage is, ironically, to maintain clarity by em-
ploying the same terminology as is found in pertinent judicial opinions. The Supreme
Court commonly uses 'inculcation" to denote the teacher's communication of value pref-
erences to children; in these opinions there is no discussion of whether the educational
goal should be accomplished by repetition and admonition. E.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No.
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch.
Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982); Ambach, 441 U.S. at 77-80. Indeed, the
inference sometimes goes the other way, in that the Court frowns upon coercive peda-
gogical techniques even while accepting transmission of preferred values in the classroom.
See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943) (stating that
schools may foster the value of national unity by "persuasion and example," but not by a
compulsory flag salute).
19 See infra notes 272, 278-80 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 348-49 and accompanying text.
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secondary levels while still acquainting schoolchildren with the
multifaceted stores of data and thinking that constitute human
knowledge. The inculcation of ideational prerequisites should give
to the children of today the wherewithal on the morrow to pre-
serve civilization, and, indeed, life itself, in an age of intensifying
international interdependency and technological invasiveness.
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP OF AMERICAN MORALS EDUCATION
IN RELATION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM
As early as 1647, the colony of Massachusetts enacted a law
requiring that children be taught such virtues as would enable
them to escape the clutches of "the old deluder Satan."" The
statute is representative of the predominating colonial attitude that
linked children's moral development with their religious indoctri-
nation.' The American revolution and formation of the new re-
public gave rise to the constitutionally mandated separation of
church and state' and a concomitant perception of the need for
values education which would also serve the purposes of the feder-
al Constitution and the republic. Prominent Founding Fathers
and early political leaders became proponents of molding a repub-
lican character in the nation's youth as a way of assuring the per-
petuation of democracy and its governmental institutionaliza-
tion.' Noah Webster, for example, devised a "Federal Catechism"
to teach children republican values.2 6 Benjamin Rush went so far
as to advocate that future generations be turned into veritable "re-
publican machines."27 Thomas Jefferson envisioned a people en-
21 Massachusetts Education Law of 1647, reprinted in READINGS IN PUBLIC EDUCATION
IN THE UNITED STATES: A COLLECTION OF SOURCES AND READINGS TO ILLUSTRATE THE
HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE AND PROGRESS IN THE UNITED STATES 18-19 (Edward
P. Cubberley ed., 1934) (citing II RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 203 (1853)).
22 Charles R. Kesler, Education and Politics: Lessons from the American Founding; 1991
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 101, 112; Joel S. Moskowitz, The Making of the Moral Child: Legal Impli-
cations of Values Education, 6 PEPP. L. REV. 105, 108 (1978); Michael A. Rebell, Ovenmiew:
Education and the Law: Schools, Values, and the Courts, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 275, 279
(1989).
23 The federal Bill of Rights provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24 Kesler, supra note 22, at 112; Rebell, supra note 22, at 279.
25 LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 1783-1876
2-5 (1980).
26 DAVID TYACK ET AL., LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785-1954 23-
24 (1987).
27 Benjamin Rush, A Plan For The Establishment of Public Schools and The Diffusion of
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lightened by those values essential to safeguard democracy.28
George Washington believed that education should convey "that
virtue or morality [which] is a necessary spring of popular govern-
ment." ' Nearly a century later, and in accord with the views of
the Founders, Abraham Lincoln beseeched education's devotees to
prosteletize a "political religion" adulating the country's Consti-
tution and other laws."°
The educational philosophy of the nation's forefathers may, in
retrospect, be deemed prophetic. Geographic expansion, indus-
trialization and the flow of immigrants to the United States im-
pressed upon later education leaders the need for imbuing chil-
dren with the brand of republican values touted at the founding
as essential to forging a distinctly American identity.3 ' The com-
mon school movement was a response to the growing need for a
republican credo and national persona that would unify an in-
creasingly diverse and scattered population. 2
In the nineteenth century, the common schools embarked
upon the mission of teaching children values thought to foster
republican character. A values curriculum evolved that included
teaching honesty, generosity, charity, individualism, self-reliance,
discipline, self-control, industriousness, obedience, patriotism, de-
mocracy and/or civic responsibility.3 The endeavor was consid-
ered relatively benign and uncontroversial, at least insofar as it did
not stray into religious content.'
Nevertheless, while generations of American schoolchildren
gathered at the common schools to sing in unison the praises of
republican virtues and memorize the pledge that we are "one
Knowledge in Pennsylvania; To Which Are Added, Thoughts Upon the Mode of Education, Proper
in a Republic. Addressed to the Legislature and Citizens of the State, reprinted in ESSAYS ON EDU-
CATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 1, 17 (Frederick Rudolph ed., 1965) (1786).
28 Thomas Jefferson, A Bill For The More General Diffusion of Knowledg reprinted in
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 365 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (1779).
29 George Washington, Farewell Address, reprinted in GEORGE WASHINGTON: A COLLEC-
TION 512, 521-22 (W.B. Allen ed., 1988) (1796).
30 Abraham Lincoln, Address To The Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois:
The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions, reprinted in I THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 1824-1848, 108, 112 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (1838).
31 Rebell, supra note 22, at 279-80.
32 Id. at 280.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 279-82. The common school movement of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries injected religion, especially Protestanism, into the curriculum. Not
surprisingly, this aspect of the common school agenda did meet with considerable contro-
versy. Id.
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nation indivisible," the unfolding history of public schooling also
began to tell a different tale. This counterpoint has resounded
dramatically in the courts, where litigants have engaged in an
ongoing dispute over the values that should be taught in the pub-
lic elementary and secondary schools. Although the basic contro-
versy has remained constant, the subject matter pitting the parties
against each other has frequently shifted over time.35 For in-
stance, during the two world wars, the values of patriotism and
national identity became the center of controversy and a focal
point for litigation. 6 More recently, the courts have been drawn
into the debate over whether schools should give children access
to books that contain profanity or sexual references."
A recurrent and volatile theme of the values debate has been
engendered by the inclusion of evolution in the curriculum.' In
the earlier part of this century, the evolution controversy burst
upon the scene with a theatrical flourish in the famous "monkey"
trial of John Thomas Scopes for the "crime" of teaching evolution
in Tennessee's public schools.3 9 Since that time, the controversy
over evolution in the public schools has persisted, producing two
U.S. Supreme Court decisions as recently as the 1980s.'
Despite the shifting focus of the subject matter of the litiga-
35 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986);
Board of Educ. Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982);
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); West Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
36 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624 (invalidating under the Free Speech Clause a com-
pulsory flag salute intended to instill feelings of national unity); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390
(invalidating, pursuant to substantive due process doctrine, a prohibition on teaching for-
eign languages intended to discourage foreign ideas).
37 See Pico, 457 U.S. at 853 (ruling under the Free Speech Clause that books con-
taining profanity and sexual references could not be removed from public school libraries
if the purpose of the removal was to limit access to ideas with which school authorities
disagreed, but that the books could be removed in order to protect children from mate-
rials educationally unsuitable to their age).
38 CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION
passim (Gryphon Editions, Inc. 1987) (1859).
39 Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927).
40 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding that a state could not, in
keeping with the Establishment Clause, insist on teaching the creationist view of the ori-
gins of life whenever evolutionary theory was taught in the public schools); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (holding invalid under the Establishment Clause a statute
that banned from use in public schools any textbooks advocating that mankind evolved
from a lower order species).
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don, the parties in these cases have all raised essentially the same
fundamental question: should public elementary and secondary
schools teach values and, if so, whose values should be taught?
Expressed in their own jargons and conceptual frameworks, this
same question has fractionalized and vexed education and child
psychology experts and legal scholars alike.
II. THE CONFLICT OVER TEACHING VALUES AMONG PEDAGOGICAL
AND PSYCHOLOGY EXPERTS
This pedagogical question has given rise to markedly disparate
schools of thought among education and child psychology experts
concerned with children's morality. At one end of the spectrum,
advocates of values clarification emphasize the procedures by
which a child comes to adopt his or her own values. The teacher
is not to teach right from wrong, but, rather, to educate the child
to a process for deciding right from wrong without intentional adult
normative input." In a similar vein, advocates of cognitive moral
development hold that by reasoning through certain hypothetical
dilemmas, children will pass through six stages of moral develop-
ment, learning in each stage to reason in ways ethically superior
to the preceding stage. 2 Values clarification and cognitive moral
development theories, which have been influential during the past
three decades," maintain that there is and can be no one set of
41 The first widely disseminated exposition of values clarification came with the pub-
lication of L. RATHS ET AL, VALUES AND TEACHING: WORKING WITH VALUES IN THE
CLASSROOM (1966). Values clarification has been generally understood to promote a val-
ue-free or relativistic values education. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 55-56
(1987); KILPATRICK, supra note 7, at 15-17, 22, 80-82; LICKONA, supra note 4, at 10-11;
MOSHMAN, supra note 10, at 158-59; Moskowitz, supra note 22, at 115-16; Andrew
Oldenquist, "Indoctrination" and Societal Suicide, 63 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 81, 82 (1981);
Rebell, supra note 22, at 285-86; Ben Wildavsky, Moral Education: Can You Not Teach Moral-
ity in Public Schools?. 2 THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY 46, 46-47 (1991/1992). But see
HOWARD KIRSCHENBAUM, ADVANCED VALUE CLARIFICATION 12-13 (1977) (arguing that val-
ues clarification has been unfairly criticized as encouraging amorality since, under his in-
terpretation, values clarification reasoning implicitly conveys the values of justice, equality,
and freedom).
42 Lawrence Kohlberg & Rochelle Mayer, Development as the Aim of Education, 42
HARV. EDUC. REV. 449, 483-94 (1972). See also Moskowitz, supra note 22, at 116, 117 &
n.62; Rebell, supra note 22, at 286-87.
43 Both values clarification and cognitive moral development initially "came into
vogue in the nation's public schools in the 1960s and 1970s." Wildavsky, supra note 41,
at 46-47. See also KILPATRICK, supra note 7, at 15, 78-80. Professor Amy Gutmann, in 1987,
described values clarification as "enjoy[] [ing] widespread use in schools throughout the
United States." GUTMANN, supra note 41, at 55. But see Rebell, supra note 22, at 287 (as-
serting that since 1989, American schools have not been widely adopting values clarifi-
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"right" values for the schools to pass on to their charges.' The
underlying message is that all values may be seriously entertained
as long as the child reasons in accordance with the approved pro-
cess of thinking about moral problems." There is, admittedly, a
certain appeal in these approaches: they appear to be faultlessly
democratic,46 respectful of juvenile dignity and autonomy,47 and
conducive to the development of reasoning capacities in relation
to moral issues.4"
Nevertheless, for many, the values clarification and cognitive
moral development approaches are troubling. First, it remains
questionable whether it is even humanly possible to teach without
at least unconsciously transmitting the values of the teacher or
school.49 Second, values clarification and cognitive moral develop-
ment may encourage in children a false subjectivism or relativism,
giving rise to the logical inference that no one set of values can
cation or cognitive moral development).
44 With respect to values clarification theorists' disapproval of telling children that
some values are better than others, see GUTMANN, supra note 41, at 55-56; KILPATRICK,
supra note 7, at 80-82; LIcKONA, supra note 4, at 10-11; MOSHMAN, supra note 10, at 158-
59; Moskowitz, supra note 22, at 115-16; Oldenquist, supra note 41, at 82; Rebell, supra
note 22, at 285-86; Wildavsky, supra note 41, at 46-47. For a depiction of cognitive moral
development adherents as holding the same attitude, see KILPATRICK, supra note 7, at 82-
85; LIcKONA, supra note 4, at 12; MOSHMAN, supra note 10, at 158-59, 164; Moskowitz,
supra note 22, at 117 & n.62; Oldenquist, supra note 41, at 82; Rebell, supra note 22, at
286-87; Wildavsky, supra note 41, at 47. But see GLTMANN, supra note 41, at 60-64 (con-
tending that the cognitive moral development approach can at least further "morality of
association").
45 LIcKoNA, supra note 4,.at 11; MOSHMAN, supra note 10, at 164; Moskowitz, supra
note 22, at 118-19. See also GUTMANN, supra note 41, at 55-56 (acknowledging that values
clarification, but not cognitive moral development, instructs children that all values may
be equally valid). But see Ingber, supra note 10, at 28-29 (arguing that value neutrality
itself promotes a bias, i.e., a liberal bias that all values are equally valid).
46 van Geel, supra note 15, at 290-91.
47 Id. at 253. See also JOSEPH TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND 67 (1977) (de-
scribing the variety of views which hold that "student-centered voluntarism" is necessary
for the preservation of "the autonomous child").
48 RATHS ET AL., VALUES AND TEACHING: WORKING WAITH VALUES IN THE CLASSROOM
249-64, 325 (2d ed. 1978); Kohlberg & Mayer, supra note 42, at 486-94. But see LIcKONA,
supra note 4, at 238-48 (pointing out that although cognitive moral development advances
children's ability to reason morally, values clarification does not have the same potential).
49 MICHAEL W. APPLE, IDEOLOGY AND CURRICULUM 1-2 (2d ed. 1990); GUTMANN, su-
pra note 41, at 55; Ingber, supra note 10, at 28-30; MOSHMAN, supra note 10, at 160. See
also MORRIS JANOWiTZ, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PATRIOTISM 163 (1983) (observing that
the very organization and operation of the schools is viewed by some as a "hidden cur-
riculum"); Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and
Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1654 (1986) (noting that it has
been argued in litigation that a value-free education is not possible).
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be right." Such a viewpoint presumably would allow the child to
conclude that apartheid is as acceptable as racial equality and
integration, or that fascism is an acceptable alternative to democ-
racy.
51
On the other side of the spectrum from the purely process-
oriented pedagogical techniques is the inculcative substantive ap-
proach that teachers should express a preference for certain values
and attempt to transmit those preferred values to their students.52
While preferred values inculcation aims at avoiding the moral
relativism that values clarification and cognitive moral development
are likely to cause, the idea of government imposing a "right" set
of values also raises the spectre of abandoning our children to
tyrannical indoctrination and docile uniformity.'- Moreover, val-
ues inculcation necessarily poses that seemingly unsolvable conun-
drum of whose values shall be taught; for, doubtless, virtually every
value is objectionable to someone.5
Is the values debate as it relates to the teaching of elementary
and secondary level children a quandary that defies human wis-
dom and leaves schools with a nightmarish choice between turning
out process-minded, amoral relativists or unreflecting, opinionated
automatons? This Article takes the position, in common with a
number of education and child psychology experts, that while
values clarification and cognitive moral development theories may
50 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
51 Professor Gutmann points out in this regard:
Treating every moral opinion as equally worthy encourages children in the false
subjectivism that "I have my opinion and you have yours and who's to say who's
right)" . . . The toleration and mutual respect that values clarification teaches is
too indiscriminate for even the most ardent democratic to embrace. If children
come to school believing that "blacks, Jews, Catholics, and/or homosexuals are
inferior beings who shouldn't have the same rights as the rest of us," then it is
criticism, not just clarification, of children's values that is needed.
GuTMANN, supra note 41, at 56.
52 WILLIAM J. BENNETT, OUR CHILDREN AND OUR COUNTRY 71, 75, 78-85 (1988);
KILPATRICE, supra note 7, at 15-16, 86, 239-43; LICKONA, supra note 4, at 38-39, 43-48,
162-84; DAVID E. PURPEL, THE MORAL & SPIRITUAL CRISIS IN EDUCATION 113-39 (1989);
Gerald Grant, Schools that Make an Imprint: Creating a Strong Positive Ethos, in CHALLENGE
TO AMERICAN SCHOOLS 127, 142-43 (1985); Wildavsky, supra note 41, at 54.
53 See KiLPATRICK, supra note 7, at 113 (conceding that character education by
means of morals transference carries the danger of "serving totalitarian causes");
TUSSMAN, supra note 47, at 80-83 (noting the potential of the state as teaching zealot to
"dutifully warp the mind to its decrees").
54 Robert M. Gordon, Freedom of Expression and Values Inculcation in the Public School
Curriculum, 13 J.L. & EDUC. 523, 555 (1984).
1995]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
contribute to improving children's processes of moral reasoning,
educating elementary and secondary level schoolchildren toward
meaningful moral maturity cannot take place without values incul-
cation."
This position arises from several considerations. As discussed
above, values clarification and cognitive moral development, with-
out values inculcation, may not be possible to effectuate as a prac-
tical matter and, even if it were possible, may tend dangerously
toward creating relativistic attitudes in children." Once created, a
relativistic mindset does not operate in a vacuum, but to the con-
trary, is strongly suspected of contributing to a deterioration in
moral behavior. 7
However, it is not simply the inadequacies of values clarifica-
tion or cognitive moral development that, by default, make values
inculcation an essential element of morals education. Rather, val-
ues inculcation at the elementary and secondary school levels has
inherently positive benefits. Perhaps the foremost positive reason
recommending values inculcation at these levels is that it is chil-
dren to whom the schools are trying to give an education in mor-
als. The poetic truism that "[t]he Child is father of the Man"58
signifies neither children's superiority nor equivalence to adults;
children are not pint-size replicas of adults. 9 Rather, children
begin life in a state of almost helpless physical and intellectual
incapacity and are ever in the process of evolving to the capacity
and self-sufficiency that comes with normal adulthood.3 They
55 E.g., KILPATRICK, supra note 7, at 15-16, 86, 239-43; LICKONA, supra note 4, at 238-
67, 326-31; James J. Digiacomo, Schools and Moral Developnent, in CARING FOR AMERICA'S
CHILDREN 159, 165-69 (Frank J. Macchiarola & Alan Gartner eds., 1989); Moskowitz, supra
note 22, at 136-37; see GUTMANN, supra note 41, at 50-64 (suggesting that cognitive moral
development may make a limited contribution to children's moral maturation in conjunc-
tion with the transmission of certain values); MOSHMAN, supra note 10, at 162-64 (observ-
ing that the stages of a child's cognitive moral development are facilitated and actualized
by some values inculcation); cf. KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 41, at 12-13 (advancing the
thesis that the methodology of values clarification must and should have the effect of
inculcating certain values).
56 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
57 LICKONA, supra note 4, at 9-21.
58 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
59 HERBERT GINSBURG & SYLVIA OPPER, PIAGET'S THEORY OF INTELLECTUAL DEVELOP-
MENT 237-38 (3d ed. 1988); Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarian-
ism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights", 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605,
651 (citing to J. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 13
(1973)).
60 HANS G. FURTH, PIAGET AND KNOWLEDGE: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 43-143 (2d
ed. 1981); Hafen, supra note 59, at 648; Wright, supra note 10, at 69. See GINSBURG &
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remain vulnerable and dependent upon adult direction for their
welfare during childhood. The U.S. Supreme Court has been sen-
sitive to this weakness, recognizing that children, simply by virtue
of being children, are susceptible to dangers which adults do not
risk and may therefore deserve special. solicitude from the law.6
The most significant consideration for purposes of this discus-
sion is that children's thought processes and cognitive perspectives
are qualitatively different from those of an adult, thereby limiting
children's ability to comprehend and judge.62 The confines of
this Article make it impossible to undertake a comprehensive sur-
vey of all those characteristics which distinguish the childish intel-
lect; however, discussion of a representative sampling of them
reveals that there is an empirical basis for the conclusion that
values inculcation must be a part of effective morals education.
Jean Piaget, a leading authority on children's mental develop-
ment," has identified an extensive catalogue of such character-
OPPER, supra note 59, at 26-207; THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PRESCHOOL CHILDREN passim (A.V.
Zaporozhets & D.B. Elkonin eds. and John Shybut & Seymore Simon trans., 1971).
61 See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747-50 (1978) (holding that an
FCC order regulating a radio program which contained pervasively sexual and excretory
language did not violate the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause because, although
adults might have a constitutionally protected right to read such materials, the broadcast
was accessible in private homes and especially to children); Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 637-43 (1968) (upholding constitutionality of a New York statute prohibiting
sale of "girlie" magazines to mirrors based upon the theory that children's freedom of
expression is not coextensive with that of adults); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
168-170 (1944) (ruling that Massachusetts laws may constitutionally proscribe children's
proselytizing on the street without violating their right to free exercise of religion or to
equal protection because "the power of the state to control the conduct of children
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults").
62 JEAN PIAGET, JUDGMENT AND REASONING IN THE CHILD passim (Marjorie Warden
trans., Littiefield, Adams & Co. 1976) (1928) [hereinafter PIAGET, JUDGMENT AND REASON-
ING]; JEAN PIAGET, THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD passim (Joan Tomlinson &
Andrew Tomlinson trans., Littlefleld, Adams & Co. 1979) (1929) [hereinafter PIAGET,
CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD]; JEAN PIAGEr, THE LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT OF THE CHILD
passim (Marjorie Gabain and Ruth Gabain trans., New American Library, Inc. 1974) (2d
ed. 1930) [hereinafter PIAGET, LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT]. See also FURTH, supra note 60,
at 17-18, 246-48, 250; GINSBURG & OPPER, supra note 59, at 6, 20-23, 26-207, 213-33. But
see DAVID WOOD, How CHILDREN THINK & LEARN 25, 33, 44-54,'72-74 (1988) (theorizing
that it is not the inherent qualitative level of the child's mental operations that distin-
guish childhood intellect, but, rather, the child's lack of expertise and exposure to cul-
tural influences).
63 Although much of Jean Piaget's seminal work on children's mental structure was
published in the 1920s, his theory of cognitive development is still viewed as a "partic-
ularly important theoretical guide to a child's thinking processes . .. " and as the "foun-
dation for much of the recent work in the field . . . ." COMMITTEE ON CHILD PSYCHIA-
TRY, GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, How OLD IS OLD ENOUGH? 20
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istics and discovered that they tend to manifest themselves within
certain age ranges. For example, children's very notion of what
thinking is changes dramatically as they mature. At about six years
of age children exhibit what Piaget termed "realism" - the attri-
bution of human intention and psychical life to physical reality,
resulting in children's inability even to recognize thought as their
own inner voice separate and apart from the external world." At
around eight years of age, although adult influences may cause
the child to learn that people think with their brains, previous
convictions persist so that the child continues to materialize
thought as existing in his or her surroundings. 5 Generally speak-
ing, it is not before the age of eleven that children are able to
move beyond realism and to reliably distinguish thought from
things.'
Realism, in turn, distorts the child's perceptions and data base
(1989). In particular, those of his findings discussed in this Article are still widely regard-
ed as valid by psychologists. Telephone Interview with Dr. Milton V. Kline (Sept. 17,
1994). This is not to say, however, that all of Piaget's ideas have been universally accept-
ed. See, e.g., MARGARET DONALDSON, CHILDREN'S MINDS 11-25 (1978); LEv WGOTSKY,
THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE 12-57 (Alex Kozulin ed. & trans., 1986); WOOD, supra note 62,
at 37-85, 147-80; see generally JEAN PIAGET: CONSENSUS AND CONTROVERSY passim (Sohan
Modgil & Celia Modgil eds., 1982) (providing critical as well as laudatory assessments of
Piaget's theories).
64 PIAGET, CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD, supra note 62, at 38-47.
65 Id. at 38, 49-54. Intrigued by Piaget's findings, but somewhat reluctant to believe
that my son, at the age of eight years and ten months, could be so unsophisticated as to
project his thoughts and feelings onto outside objects, I asked him a few questions of
the type posed by Piaget to the children he was studying. E.g., id. at 174-87. The follow-
ing exchange resulted:
AUTHOR: If I prick a dog, does the dog feel it?
WILLIAM: Yes.
AUTHOR. Well, how about if I prick a cloud?
WILLIAM: No. A cloud is not living.
AUTHOR: Can the cloud feel the wind or not?
WILLIAM: Yes, it can.
AUTHOR. Can a bench feel anything?
WILLIAM: No.
AUTHOR If someone burned the bench, would the bench feel that?
WILLIAM: Yes. The bench would hurt. [Pause] No. The bench isn't alive.
Interview with William Meyrowitz, in Birmingham, Mich. (Mar. 4, 1993). Incidentally, at
the time of this interview, William was in the third grade and receiving grades no lower
than Bs on his report card. Thus, the questions revealed continued exteriorization of
thoughts and feelings by a good student. Although William was able to correct himself
about the bench, he did not see the need to do so in relation to the cloud feeling the
wind. Perhaps this inconsistency reflects that he had begun the transition away from
attributing his inner mental life to outer objects.
66 PIAGET, CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD, supra note 62, at 54-55.
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and constrains reasoning power. Piaget found that, among other
things, realism gives rise to the following phenomena in children:
the conviction that they possess magical power enabling them to
command the external -world;67 an inability to reason by means of
logical relationships, i.e., by generalization and deduction;' the
illusion that their own subjectivity is the only conceivable view-
point, requiring neither introspection nor proof;a and animism
such that children regard many inert objects0 as living and con-
scious and endow those objects with a purpose that is obedient to
mankind's needs and wishes.7
Of particular interest here is children's incapacity for logical
thinking. Piaget traced, this incapacity not only to realism and ani-
mism, but also to the narrow field of attention upon which
preteenage children base their perceptions of the environment.
By narrow field of attention, Piaget meant that children perceive
things "in light of the moment, without order .... " and expe-
rience difficulty in thinking of more than one thing at a time.74
The result is syncretism and transduction: "By the mere fact of not
being considered in their internal relations, but only as presented
by immediate perception, things are either conglomerated into a
confused whole (syncretism), or else considered one by one in a
67 Id. at 154-58, 166-68.
68 d. at 158-59, 166-68.
69 Id. at 167, 239-40; PIAGET, JUDGMENT AND REASONING, supra note 62, at 216-17.
70 PIAGET, CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD, supra note 62, at 169. See supra note 65 (re-
porting my eight year old son's view that a cloud can "feel" the wind). Again experienc-
ing some disbelief that Piaget's discoveries in the 1920s could hold true for modern day
children, I asked my eight year old son whether he thinks the sun is alive or not. I fully
expected a negative answer since William prides himself on his interest and academic
achievement in science. Indeed, he has studied the solar system in school and he and I
have spent many hours together poring over books about astronomy. William, however,
stated with great certainty and some disdain for the stupidity of my question that the sun
is alive. When I inquired as to his reasons for this conclusion, he replied, "The sun is
alive because stars die; also, the sun has heat." Interview with William Meyrowitz, in Bir-
mingham, Mich. (Mar. 2, 1993). It is interesting to note that although William has been
exposed to a wealth of age-appropriate scientific information about the sun, he has ap-
parently absorbed that information-stars die and the sun has heat-through the lens of
animism and therefore reached a distorted, animistic understanding of what the sun is.
71 PIAGET, CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD, supra note 62, at 222-32.
72 PIAGET, JUDGMENT AND REASONING, supra note 62, at 191. It should be clarified
that Piaget did not regard the intellect as static between infancy and adolescence. On the
contrary, he viewed this period as one of gradual development toward the capacity for
logical thinking or formal mental operations, with some preconditions for that capacity
beginning to manifest themselves as early as seven or eight years old. Id. at 191, 243-44.
73 Id. at 221.
74 Id. at 215-21.
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fragmentary manner devoid of synthesis [transduction]."7 5
Syncretism is "completely unanalytic, ' ' 6 predisposing the child
to rely upon comprehensive subjective schemata in which every-
thing is fused with everything else, without causation or analogy as
justification. 7 Transduction is an equally unanalytic substitution
for deduction and induction. This means that the child reasons
"by inferences from particular to particular .... without . . . [the]
logical rigour"7 that accompanies adult reasoning from the gen-
eral to the particular (deduction) or from the particular to the
general (induction). 7" The dominance of transduction in child-
hood thinking tends to preclude the child from forming general
propositions or laws and from employing assumed hypotheses in
his or her mental operations.80
It may be objected at this point that these characteristics of
children's mental processes are of somewhat limited relevance in
deciding whether values inculcation is a necessary part of morals
education for children in high school since Piaget addressed the
characteristics predominantly in children who were twelve years
old or younger.8 In anticipation of such an objection, let it first
be noted that Piaget often referred to eleven or twelve years as
the approximate8 2 age at which these characteristics begin to di-
minish."
75 Id. at 220.
76 Id. at 228.
77 Id. at 227-28, 230; GINSBURG & OPPER, supra note 59, at 106, 108-09.
78 PIAGET, JUDGMENT AND REASONING, supra note 62, at 183.
79 GINSBURG & OPPER, supra note 59, at 81.
80 PIAGET, JUDGMENT AND REASONING, supra note 62, at 184, 233, 238-39.
81 GINSBURG & OPPER, supra note 59, at 180. For example, Piaget ascertained that,
generally speaking, adolescents can reason from hypotheses by deduction and can theo-
rize possible determinants of the results of experiments, behaviors manifesting the ability
to engage in the formal mental operations of an adult. Id. at 187-88, 201-02, 206.
82 In those of Piaget's works cited in this Article, he frequently shows a reluctance
to definitively pinpoint the onset of the teenage years as the inception of logical reason-
ing capacities. The following quotations are representative. The ability to deduce appears
at "about the age of 11-12." PIAGET, JUDGMENT AND REASONING, supra note 62, at 69. At
"the age of about 11-12" the child becomes capable of giving bona fide definitions. Id. at
149. It is "not until about the age of 11-12 that we can really talk of 'logical experi-
ment.'" Id. at 243. Thought is no longer materialized at "the average age of . . . 11-12."
PIAGET, CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD, supra note 62, at 39. It is at "about 11" that the
child understands that a dream is not a material image. Id. at 121. Up to "about the
ages of 11-12" children believe that certain objects obey moral laws. Id. at 228.
83 Piaget often referred to the elements of logical reasoning as appearing gradually,
rather than in full-blown form, from the ages of eleven or twelve. "As the years increased
[after age eleven], there was a . . . diminution of syncretism." PIAGET, LANGUAGE AND
THOUGHT, supra note 62, at 170. The "possibility" of formal reasoning exists at eleven or
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This flexibility about age in the context of demarcating stages
of intellectual development is consistent with his view that "[t]he
evolution of intelligence is ... not ... continuous, but rhythmi-
cal; it seems at times to go back upon itself, it is subject to waves,
to interferences, and to 'periods' of variable length."84 Room is
therefore left for assuming that teenagers may possess childish pre-
logical intellectual characteristics, albeit in lessening degree as the
teenager grows older.85 Such an assumption seems a particularly
safe one in light of the fact that Piaget also suggested that normal
adolescents can reach the stage of logical thought as late as be-
tween the ages of fifteen and twenty years.8 Hence, if Piaget is
correct about the development of adolescent intelligence, then
teenagers in high school may be expected to retain varying aspects
and incidences of childhood pre-logical thinking.8 7
Furthermore, it should be noted that adolescent intelligence
may be subject to dynamics which are common to neither younger
children nor most adults. It is thought that once adolescents ac-
twelve years of age. PIAGET, JUDGMENT AND REASONING, supra note 62, at 72. The ability
to classify planes of reality into a hierarchy "begins" at the age of twelve. Id. at 246, 251.
After the ages of eleven or twelve, the child's "mental structure is becoming that of the
adult." PIAGET, CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD, supra note 62, at 32. The "beginnings" of
the stage when children can distinguish thought from things is approximately at eleven
years old. Id. at 55.
84 PIAGET, JUDGMENT AND REASONING, supra note 62, at 215. Accord COMMITTEE ON
CHILD PSYCHIATRY, supra note 63, at 21.
85 GINSBURG & OPPER, supra note 59, at 202, 204.
86 Id. at 204. See also COMMITrEE ON CHILD PSYCHIATRY, supra note 63, at 28-29 (re-
ferring to a study that indicates that up until the twelfth grade children tend to lack
certain decision-making skills and suggesting that even twelfth graders may possess savvy
rather than formal thought).
87 Herbert Ginsburg and Sylvia Opper, experts on Piaget, remark with respect to the
applicability of his developmental theories to adolescents:
First, . . . Piaget does not mean to say that the typical adolescent of the formal
stage always employs all or some of the formal operations in scientific problem
solving, but rather that he is capable of doing so. Various factors may prevent
their use. Under conditions of fatigue or boredom, for instance, the adolescent
may not fully display the organization of thought available to him. Piaget's mod-
el of formal operations describes the adolescent's optimum level of functioning,
and not necessarily his typical performance.
Second, we can inquire into the generality of the formal operations. Are
all adolescents capable of them? Are the formal operations universal? The evi-
dence seems to show that they are not. In western cultures, some adolescents do
not seem capable of the formal operations; in some nonwestern cultures, the
formal operations seem to be completely absent, even in adults.
GINSBURG & OPPER, supra note 59, at 203. Contra MOSHMAN, supra note 10, at 72-73, 76-
78.
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quire some capability of logical thinking, they have a tendency to
become overly engrossed in metaphysical, political and philosophi-
cal doctrines.s They may even lose touch with reality in the pro-
cess and believe that their thoughts make them omnipotent.89 On
an emotional plane, adolescents are also beset with sexual and
aggressive urges, fears, fantasies and emotional storms that can
interfere with their growing ability to engage in abstract and for-
mal thought."
As superficial as this foray into the field of child psychology
may be, it shows that an accepted scientific foundation exists for
concluding that the characteristics of juvenile cognition distort the
way children, even well into their teenage years, digest and utilize
new information in comparison to adults.9 This conclusion
88 GINSBURG & OPPER, supra note 59, at 202-03; Anna Freud, Insight: Its Presence and
Absence as a Factor in Normal Development, in PSYCHoANALYIric PSYCHOLOGY OF NORMAL
DEVELOPMENT 1970-1980 137, 146 (1982). But cf ROBERT COLES, THE MORAL LIFE OF
CHILDREN 198 (1986) (contending that youthful idealism is not necessarily an excess of
adolescence, but, rather, "has its roots in all the emotional, moral, and social complexi-
ties this life can present to anyone").
89 GINSBURG & OPPER, supra note 59, at 203. In 1940, Jean Piaget wrote:
Adolescent egocentricity is manifested by belief in the omnipotence of reflection,
as though the world should submit itself to idealistic schemes rather than to sys-
tems of reality. It is the metaphysical age par excellence, the self is strong enough
to reconstruct the universe and big enough to incorporate it.
WOOD, supra note 62, at 155 (quoting Jean Piaget).
90 COMMITTEE ON CHILD PSYCHIATRY, supra note 63, at 32. Cf FREUD, supra note 88,
at 305 (observing that adolescents also undergo a "crisis of identity"). But cf. MOSHMAN,
supra note 10, at 85-86 (stating that adolescents are not measurably different from adults
in terms of achieving socioemotional autonomy). Nor should it be overlooked that
preteenage children may experience an emotional life that is, in some respects, peculiar
to their age group and apt to color cognition. For example, the libidinal stages which
Sigmund Freud attributed to normal early childhood may cause younger children to be
especially inner-directed and prone to body-related fantasies. COMMITTEE ON CHILD PSY-
CHIATRY, supra note 63, at 31, 35-36.
91 See supra notes 41-90 and accompanying text; see also GINSBURG & OPPER, supra
note 59, at 237-39 (summarizing some of Piaget's findings concerning the distortions
inherent in childhood cognition and suggesting that these findings require reassessment
of educational approaches). Interestingly, Piaget's basic conclusion that children's cogni-
tion is qualitatively different from and inferior to adult cognition is supported, in gen-
eral, by the independent research of other psychologists showing that as children grow
older there is a corresponding development in their ability to perceive and process infor-
mation. See, e.g., MOSHMAN, supra note 10, at 68-78 (asserting that children begin with a
limited capacity for rationality which improves as they mature); LEV VYGOTSKY, MIND IN
SOCIETY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES 28-29, 45-46, 49-51, 55-
57 (Michael Cole et al. eds., 1978) (proposing that the child's embryonic reasoning abili-
ty gradually develops through the mediation of language, tool use, and interactions with
other people).
Lest the reader receive the impression that Piaget regarded children's cognitive
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should be no less supportable when the information at issue con-
cerns morals or values.92 Without adult normative input, what sort
of data base about morals can a child acquire on his or her own
when the child spontaneously imbues inert objects with conscious-
ness; perceives things as fragmentary and momentary; believes that
he or she has magical powers over the external world; or is caught
up in the emotional turmoil that can accompany puberty? Indeed,
Piaget observed that up until the age of eight many children even
believe in an automatic justice emanating from physical nature
and inanimate objects.93 In considering children's unique cogni-
tive attributes, it thus becomes evident that conveying mere pro-
stages as simply biologically predetermined, it should be noted that he also regarded the
progression from one stage to another as subject to the influence of children's interac-
tions with their environment, including social interactions. See, e.g., PIAGET, JUDGMENT AND
REASONING, supra note 62, at 72-73, 180; see GINSBURG & OPPER, supra note 59, at 218-28.
92 Jean Piaget analyzed, albeit somewhat summarily, the effects of childhood ego-
centrism, realism, and animism upon youngsters' capacity to reason about morals. He
concluded that such cognitive dynamics cause children to make moral judgments on the
basis of qualitatively different criteria than adults use. JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT
OF THE CHILD 145, 163-65, 316 (Marjorie Gabain trans., 1966) (1932). Curiously, in this
volume Piaget neglects to analyze the effects on moral reasoning of other childhood
cognitive characteristics that seem particularly relevant. For example, the book contains
no discussion and no explanation for the absence of any discussion regarding the effects
of the child's syncretism, transduction, inability to utilize hypothetical premises, inability
to conceive of general propositions, or belief in magical power. PIAGET, supra passim.
Instead, the book's main focus is on the influence of two formative and loosely sequen-
tial processes: the child's unilateral respect for adults and older children (which leads to
heteronomy) followed by the child's cooperation with other people (which leads to au-
tonomy). Id. at 194-95.
One commentator has remarked about this lack of follow-through and the change
of emphasis exhibited in THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD:
Instead of pursuing the precise developmental analysis which he began, and for
which he undoubtedly had the data and material available, he returned to invok-
ing his vaguer and more limited social-psychological perspective . . . . In con-
trast, in a brief analysis of the egocentrism of the child's early rule conception,
he did not invoke the parental variable, instead he concentrated on the pro-
cesses of the child's thinking, and this analysis has a clarity and richness which
is provocatively brief - a mere couple of pages.
Helen Weinreich-Haste, Piaget on Morality: A Critical Perspective, in PIAGET, supra, at 189. See
also JAMES R. REST, DEVELOPMENT IN JUDGING MORAL ISSUES 6 (1979) (mentioning that
Piaget's study of children's moral judgment "only provides a limited characterization of
the cognitive structures underlying . . . verbalizations" about moral issues).
Incidentally, it is interesting to note that Lawrence Kohlberg originated the pedago-
gy of cognitive moral development in large measure based upon and in reaction to the
schema of children's moral evolution advanced by Piaget. 2 LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS
ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE NATURE AND VALIDrIY OF MORAL STAGES xviii-xix, xxviii-
xxix (1984). See PIAGET, supra, at 203; Cf. MOSHMAN, supra note 10, at 79.
93 PIAGET, supra note 92, at 316.
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cesses of thinking about right and wrong, without transmission of
any content as to what is right or wrong, does nothing to expand
and make more accurate the deficient and distorted values data
base which children are predisposed to create.94
Even assuming that the child could amass and retain a morals
data base founded upon realistic perceptions, is it likely that the
child could utilize the information so as to make meaningful deci-
sions about moral issues if all that is taught on the subject is pro-
cesses of reasoning that are predicated upon adult logic? How can
a youngster reason in any productive way about the moral dilem-
mas offered as instructive fare by proponents of values clarifica-
tion95 and cognitive moral development95 when the child is not
94 Cf. KILPATRICK, supra note 7, at 27, 86-89, 94, 116-17 (contending that teaching
children only reasoning processes is insufficient morals education since the children will
be reasoning about matters of which they are ignorant); LICKONA, supra note 4, at 11
(noting that values clarification erred by "treating kids like grown-ups who only needed
to clarify values that were already sound" and by failing to take into account that chil-
dren "need a good deal of help in developing sound values in the first place"); Wright,
supra note 10, at 63-64, 68-70, 74, 78 (suggesting that schoolchildren cannot possess the
information essential to exercising free speech unless values are first transferred from
adults to the children).
95 A typical exercise used by values clarification adherents is called "The Fallout
Shelter" in which the teacher asks students to assume that there has been a nuclear war
and that the future of mankind depends upon who is allowed into a fallout shelter. The
teacher tells students that the shelter can accommodate only six people and then re-
quests students to decide which six of ten people clamoring for entry should be saved.
The ten possible survivors include a retarded girl, a violent police officer, a prostitute, a
drug pusher, a racist, and a person recently released from a mental institution. LICKONA,
supra note 4, at 236.
One critic has observed that "the fallout shelter exercise, with its forced-choice for-
mat, is structured to lead students to ignore a basic ethical principle: All persons, as
human beings, have equal worth and an equal right to live. The shelter activity invites
students to rank human lives on a crass, utilitarian basis . . . ." Id. at 236.
Even more to the point here, notice how resolution of "The Fallout Shelter" neces-
sitates thinking processes of which most children are not capable until the age of thir-
teen and of which many teenagers will be, in some respects, incapable as well. "The
Fallout Shelter" requires the student to reason from multiple assumed hypotheses. As the
text above explains, children cannot reason from assumed premises and have difficulty
juggling more than one concept at a time. See supra text accompanying notes 62-92.
Children's inability to break free from their subjectivity will also minimize the possibility
of their even considering classmates' opinions and experiencing meaningful dialogue. See
supra text accompanying note 69. Certainly the inability to engage in induction and de-
duction or to form general propositions will make children's reasoning about who best
can perpetuate the human race well near irrational. See supra text accompanying notes
68, 72-80. Finally, children's belief in their own magical power to command the world
and especially adolescents' delusions of omnipotence through thought are likely to ham-
per logical or realistic consideration of the exercise's solution. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 67, 71, 88-89.
96 Illustrative of the cognitive moral development approach is the following problem,
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able even to conceive of his or her thought as a phenomenon
purely internal to the self, is deluded by the notion that his or
her subjective reactions are the only possible viewpoint; is unable
to understand what a hypothesis or general law is; and/or thinks
by means of transduction and syncretism rather than by processes
of deduction and inductiori? 7
considered suitable for consumption by eight-year olds:
During recess on the playground, you see a big fourth-grader bullying a smaller
kid, a second-grader. He's pushing him around, punching him in the arm, just
being mean. You don't really know the kid who's getting picked on. What would
you do if you saw this happening? What should you do? Why?
LICKONA, supra note 4, at 239-40. A problem considered appropriate for first-graders un-
der this approach is "Mark and the Movies":
Mark was on the way to the movies when he met his friend Steven. Steven said
he really wanted to see this movie too, but he spent all his allowance and
wouldn't be getting any more until after the movie left town. Both Mark and
Steven were 12 but could easily pass for younger. If they lied about their age,
they could both get in on the money Mark had. Mark didn't know, though, if
he should lie about his age. Steven said, "It's your money, so it's your decision."
What should Mark do?
Id. at 246 (paraphrasing from Dennis Adams, Building Moral Dilenma Activities, LEARNING,
Mar. 1977, at 46).
Although presented to children under thirteen years old, both problems require the
formal logical operations of an adult in order for any morally defensible resolution to be
reached. Both problems pose multiple assumed hypotheses. Yet, children cannot easily
work from theoretical hypotheses or conceptualize several ideas simultaneously. See supra
text accompanying notes 74, 80. Children's exaggerated subjectivity will hinder meaningful
exchange of ideas about the dilemmas with their peers and, in the children's eyes, make
reasoned justification seem superfluous. See supra text accompanying notes 93. Children's
resistance to induction and deduction will impede factually-based, logical judgment about
what the children would or should do when faced with the scenarios of the bullying
problem or of "Mark and the Movies." See supra text accompanying notes 68, 72-80. How,
too, can children decide upon a moral course of action in response to &ese dilemmas
when the children cannot conceive of the general laws that might govern and when they
believe that their childish wishes can magically control events? See supra text accompany-
ing notes 67, 71, 80. Even if all of these general cognitive limitations did not exist, mor-
al realism would, in all likelihood, interfere with children's evaluation of moral answers
to such dilemmas. Jean Piaget used the term "moral realism" to denote the phenomenon
whereby children evaluate moral questions by the criteria of objective harm done rather
than the intentions that prompted the harm. PIAGET, supra note 92, at 124-33, 160-62. It
is noteworthy that moral realism persists for a longer time in relation to the child's eval-
uation of other people's conduct than in relation to evaluation of his or her own con-
duct. Id. at 183. Thus, moral realism could well be a factor distorting the moral judg-
ment of even an older child asked to assess whether Mark should lie so as to, get Steven
into the cinema.
97 See Derek Graham, Moral Develomnt: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach, in COG-
NITIVE DEVELOPMENT IN THESCHOOL YEARS 112, 115-19 (Ann Floyd ed., 1979) (surveying
research, predicated upon Jean Piaget's work, in support of the proposition that develop-
ment of moral principles is dependent on concomitant development of cognitive ability).
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The educational implications of children's distorted data base
and illogical reasoning are manifold and subject to debate.98 Yet,
this much may be distilled with some confidence from Piaget's
discoveries: children do not have the mental structure or life expe-
riences to make sound moral choices on the basis of reasoning
skills alone. Indeed, although this Article has gone to some
lengths to establish a scientific foundation for such a distillation,
this aspect of children's intellect has not uncommonly been treat-
ed by legal commentators almost as a matter of common sense.9
Justice Stewart seems instinctively to have credited this phenome-
non when he stated as a given that children do not have the ca-
pacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of Free
Speech Clause freedoms." °
If Justice Stewart and the scientific evidence described above
are correct, then the conclusion is inescapable that children's
moral education cannot take place simply by exposing them to a
melange of values and after some honing of reasoning techniques
through values clarification methods or the like, requesting the
children to choose whatever value they prefer. If the public ele-
mentary and secondary schools are to educate children about
But see WOOD, supra note 62, at 149 (arguing that morality does not rest upon use of
logic). See also KILPATRICK, supra note 7, at 132-43 (observing that emotions also play a
role in how children learn morals); MICHAEL SIEGAL, FAIRNESS IN CHILDREN: A SOCIAL-
COGNrTVE APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 72, 85, 178-79 (1982) (as-
serting that while cognitive maturation is an important part of morals comprehension,
children's identification with their parents is "a possible, pervasive process in moral devel-
opment").
98 Compare PIAGET, supra note 92, at 319, 364, 366, 369, 370-71, 404-06 (favoring
education by cooperative efforts with children involving the latter's active role rather than
through adult constraint of children) and WOOD, supra note 62, at 140-43 (proposing
that children need first to listen to adult discourse in order to learn) and GINSBURG &
OPPER, supra note 59, at 241, 253-54 (asserting that learning different types of knowledge
necessitates different types of teaching techniques and that social knowledge calls for
didactic methods while physical knowledge calls for manipulation and exploration) and
KILPATRICK, supra note 7, at 24, 26-27, 78, 88-94 (taking the position that values trans-
mission from adults to children is essential to morally educating the children) with
LICKONA, supra note 4, at 68-70, 76, 162-63 (offering a range of pedagogical techniques
for transmitting morals such as having teachers act as moral role models, using moral
discipline, creating a democratic classroom environment, and conveying values through
curriculum).
99 See, e.g., TuSSMAN, supra note 47, at 53, 64-65; David A. Diamond, The First
Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REv. 477,
488-95 (1981); Bruce C. Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority:
Public Schools as Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663, 701, 703 (1987); Wright, supra
note 10, at 69, 78.
100 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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morals, the schools must also transmit to their students some
minimum core of values with the editorialization that such values
are preferred or "better" and a full explanation for the preferred
status.
10
Aside from the fact that it is the distinctive population of
children who are taught in the elementary and secondary schools,
there is another circumstance militating in favor of a substantive
values inculcation pedagogy. Children in the United States typical-
ly are bombarded with an array of value judgments emanating
from their parents,102  peers,"' religious affiliations"' and, of
course, an omnipresent media.105 With the exception of the lat-
ter, none of these people or institutions are under the control of
101 See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text. Indeed, even the father of the cog-
nitive moral development approach, Lawrence Kohlberg, came to the conclusion that
inculcation is a necessary part of morals education:
Some years of active involvement with the practice of moral education at Cluster
School has led me to realize that my notion ...was mistaken ... the educa-
tor must be a socializer teaching value content and behavior, and not only a So-
cratic or Roguian process-facilitator of development ... I no longer hold these
negative views of indoctrinative moral education and I believe that the concepts
guiding moral education must be partly "indoctrinative." This is true, by neces-
sity, in a world in which children engage in stealing, cheating and aggression.
KILPATRICK, supra note 7, at 92 (quoting Lawrence Kohlberg's writings in 1978 in THE
HUMANIST). But see Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of, the Schools as Con-
ceptual Development, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1269, 1296-99 (1991) (maintaining that students learn
values through interactive processes' and critical thinking rather than through inculcative
methods); van Geel, supra note 15, at 263-71 (arguing that there is no empirical basis for
concluding that inculcation is an essential means of value formation in schoolchildren).
102 JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 182, 195
(1991); BENJAMIN SPOcK, RAISING CHILDREN IN A DIFFICULT TIME 63 (1985); Gene H.
Brody & David R. Shaffer, Contributions of Parents and Peers to Children's Moral Socialization,
2 DEv. 31, 59 (1982). But see KILPATRICK, supra note 7, at 246 (observing that many par-
ents are either too stressed or self-absorbed to pay much heed to their children). The
U.S. Supreme Court has long acknowledged the pivotal role of parents in directing the
upbringing of their children. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
103 JOHN I. GOODLAb, A PLACE CALLED SCHOOLZ PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 42
(1984). See Thomas J. Berndt, Contributions of Peer Relationships to Children's Developmen in
PEER RELATIONSHIPS IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 407, 415 (Thomas J. Berndt & Gary W. Ladd
eds., 1989); Brody & Shaffer, supra note 102, at 59-66; Jacqueline Mize et al., Promoting
Positive Peer Relations with Young Children: Rationales and Strategies, 14 CHILD CARE Q. 221,
222 (1985); Michele Ingrassa et al., Lifre Means Nothing, NEWSWEEK, July 19, 1993, at 16-17;
Barbara Kantrowitz, Wild in the Streets, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2, 1993, at 40, 44.
104 KILPATRICK, supra note 7, at 261-63.
105 ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 58-59 (1987); KILPATRICK,
supra note 7, at 171, 175, 181-83, 264-65; LICKONA, supra note 4, at 4-5, 406-07; Joshua C.
Ramo, Have Fun, But Keep Your Head, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 27, 1993, at 65; Megan Rosenfeld,
Warning: TV Violence Is Harmful, Networks Acknowledge, WASH. POST, July 1, 1993, at Al.
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the government vis-a-vis values transmission.'
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly deferred to
the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their offspring.
0 7
This parental prerogative is magnified by the fact that children are
dependent upon parents and, especially at younger ages, seek
parental approval. 10 8 Under this balance of forces, the parent has
free rein over values inculcation in the home; there is little to
prevent a parental dictatorship over children's early moral develop-
ment if the parent is so inclined.' Still, there may be some
comfort in the cliched expectation that parents will have the best
interests of their children at heart. There is considerably less com-
fort in the spectacle of the media engulfing young minds without
restraint. For example, the television programming, movies, rock
music, and video games to which many children are exposed are
riddled with glamorized and depersonalized violence, among other
disturbing images."0 Although there have been societal pressures
106 E.g., Children's Television Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 303a-303b (West 1991 &
Supp. 1994); National Endowment for Children's Educational Television Act of 1990, 47
U.S.C.A. § 394 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994). See also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
747-50 (1978) (upholding sanctions imposed on a radio broadcaster for violating regula-
tions prohibiting the use of certain language because of the likelihood that children
might be in the listening audience).
107 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399-402 (1923). But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-46 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for taking into account only
Amish parents' interest in educating their young the Amish way without regard to the
children's desires).
108 ALICE MILLER, THE DRAMA OF THE GIFTED CHILD: THE SEARCH FOR THE TRUE
SELF xviii, 8 (1981).
109 Wright, supra note 10, at 74. Cf Mary Kohler, To What Are Children Entitled?, in
THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT 217, 218 (Beatrice Gross & Ronald Gross eds., 1977)
(noting that legal concepts of parental control leave children with little opportunity for
self-determination).
110 Network television recently acknowledged that its violent programming is readily
accessible to children and contributes to the latter's antisocial behavior. Rosenfeld, supra
note 105, at Al; Harry F. Waters et al., Networks Under the Gun, NEWSWEEK, July 12, 1993,
at 64. The film industry is equally culpable in producing "decades of movies from 'A
Clockwork Orange' to 'Menace II Society'" that adulate youth violence. Kantrowitz, supra
note 103, at 42. Rock music has been accused of fostering violent attitudes as well, par-
ticularly toward women. KILPATRICK, supra note 7, at 175-76, 181-82. Even toys, and espe-
cially video games, convey the idea that "'[flighting is cool.'" Ramo, supra note 105, at
65 (quoting a 16-year-old's reaction to the video game Mortal Kombat). See Esther B.
Fein, Troubled by Playthings of Violence, Parents Ponder Choices for Holidays, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
23, 1993, at A14.
Enjoyment of violence, however, is but one of the destructive values that the media
conveys. For instance, some rock music is thought to encourage egocentrism in children
and alienation from the older generation. KILPATRICK, supra note 7, at 175, 183. Video
games may desensitize children to the difference between high art and pop culture and
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on the media to exercise more responsibility in selecting the val-
ues content of children's entertainment, the industry has resisted
and remains largely unchecked.'
These generators of values operate upon children in relatively
uncontrolled venues; the public school system is the one continu-
ous significant conduit by which government can control and
transmit values reflecting the interests of its constituency, "We the
People.""' If the governmental viewpoint is not to be lost among
the barrage of values messages emanating from the private sector,
that viewpoint must stand for something, morally speaking."'
While not presuming to reject values clarification or cognitive
moral development as devoid of any redeeming pedagogical merit,
this writer finds persuasive that the very condition of being a child
and of being a child in modern American society makes substan-
tive values inculcation a virtual imperative for effective morals
education at the elementary and secondary levels.
promote consumerist values. MARSHA KINDER, PLAYING wTrH POWER IN MoviEs, TELEVI-
SION, AND VIDEO GAMES 119 (1991).
111 "Many in Congress, roused by the soaring tide of prime-time gore, have been
threatening federally imposed reforms." Waters et al., supra note 110, at 64. In order to
avoid legislative action, the networks agreed to broadcast parental advisories before airing
excessively violent programs, without taking any measures to alter program content. Id.
Indeed, even such scanty legislative restraints as currently govern children's television
programming are honored more in the breach than otherwise by broadcasters. A flagrant
example is television's response to the requirement in the Children's Television Act of
1990 that broadcasters must demonstrate their commitment to the educational needs of
children as a condition of renewing their licenses. Children's Television Act of 1990, 47
U.S.C.A. § 303b(a)(2) (West 1991 & Supp. 1994). Some television stations have argued
that they have fulfilled this requirement with the likes of "G.I. Joe," "Superboy," "The
Flintstones," and reruns of "Leave It to Beaver" - an argument that was accepted under
President Bush but which has been rejected by the Clinton administration. Edmund L.
Andrews, Tintstones' and Programs Like It Aren't 'Educational' F.C.C. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
4, 1993, at Al.
112 U.S. CONsT. pmbl. As one commentator has noted, "Americans actually have a
common core of social morality to conserve . . . [and] this core ought to be conserved
with the help of the public schools." Andrew Oldenquist, "Indoctrination" and Societal Sui-
cide, 63 PUB. 81, 84 (1981). See also ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 287,
304-08 (J.P. Mayer ed. and George Lawrence trans., Garden City, New York, Anchor
Books, 1969) (1850) (ascribing the success of-early American democracy to the moral
condition of the people). Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the public
schools "as the primary vehicle for transmitting 'the values on which our society rests.'"
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76
(1979)). See also Gordon, supra note 55 at 553 (describing government's compelling inter-
est in conveying, through the public schools, society's fundamental values).
113 See KILPATRICK, supra note 7, at 122.
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III. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL CONFLICT OVER TEACHING VALUES
Although data about children's intellectual capacities and the
societal influences brought to bear on them lead logically to the
pedagogical conclusion that values inculcation is essential, the First
Amendment may yet make moot what logic and pedagogy dictate.
The problem is that what is essential from an educational stand-
point is not necessarily constitutionally tolerable. If it is the case
that the Constitution cannot countenance effective morals educa-
tion, then a great paradox would ensue. Free speech law would
become a substantial impediment, not only to children's well-being
during childhood, but to their chance of maturing into principled
adults who can safeguard constitutional guarantees that require
citizen participation, including the free speech guarantee itself. 4
It is not only children's sense of right and wrong that would be
affected by a constitutional prohibition of values inculcation; the
very credibility of the Constitution would be undermined by the
sorry spectacle of Free Speech Clause law undermining free
speech objectives and the moral tone of American life. With so
much at stake, the possibility that this scenario has or may become
a national reality warrants close examination of the pertinent judi-
cial precedents."5
114 For a discussion of the need for an enlightened citizenry to make constitutional
guarantees of free speech and democratic participation meaningful, see Susan H.
Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Begin-
ning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550, 550, 596-606
(1992).
115 The exegesis of pertinent judicial precedents undertaken in Part III of this Article
is intentionally confined to U.S. Supreme Court decisions addressing the constitutionality
of values inculcation by elementary and secondary schools. The rationale for excluding
cases dealing with the issue at the university level is that the more mature student popu-
lation enrolled in college allows professors to utilize different pedagogical techniques that
entail increased reliance on broad ranging inquiry and debate. This difference between
precollege and college education has significant ramifications for the applicability of Free
Speech Clause protections, resulting in heightened protection in the university context as
compared to elementary and secondary schools. Brian A. Freeman, The Supreme Court and
First Amendment Rights of Students in the Public School Classroom: A Proposed Model of Analysis,
12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 15-16, 52 (1984); Stephen R. Goldstein, The Asserted Consti-
tutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV.
1293, 1342-44 (1976); Hafen, supra note 99, at 717-18; William B. Senhauser, Note, Educa-
tion and the Court: The Supreme Court's Educational Ideology, 40 VAND. L. REV. 939, 952-54,
959, 962-65, 971, 974-75 (1987). But cf. C. Thomas Dienes & Annemargaret Connolly,
When Students Speak. Judicial Review in the Academic Marketplace, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
343, 384 & n.150 (1989) (citing a case addressing free speech issues in the university as
support for the proposition that there should be no censorship of beliefs and values in
precollege schooling).
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Even though this Article deals with the constitutionality of
values inculcation only in public schools and only under the Free
Speech Clause, it is instructive to begin this survey with the U.S.
Supreme Court's earliest pronouncements on the subject of values
inculcation in private settings and under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause."' The cases, Meyer v.
Nebraska"7 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,"' are of interest be-
cause at the time they were decided, the Court did not yet under-
stand the First Amendment to apply to the states."9 Thus, Meyer's
and Pierce's treatment of values inculcation may be loosily regard-
ed as the precursor of subsequent decisions interpreting the Free
Speech Clause. 2
In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court heard a challenge by a paro-
chial school teacher to a Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching'
of foreign languages to students who had not yet passed the
eighth grade. 2' The main purpose of the statute, which gov-
erned all schools in the state, was "to promote civic development
by inhibiting ... education of the immature in foreign tongues
and ideals before they could learn English and acquire American
ideals."1" The Court did not quibble with the notion that Ne-
braska could require educators to inculcate values:
That the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to
improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and mor-
ally, is clear .... The desire of the legislature to foster a ho-
mogenous people with American ideals prepared readily to
understand current discussions of civic matters is easy to appre-
116 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1. -
117 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
118 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
119 Subsequent to Meyer and Pierce, the U.S. Supreme Court approved the application
to the states of the First Amendment's protection of free speech through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 11-2,
at 772 (2d ed. 1988); Howard 0. Hunter, Curriculum, Pedagogy, and the Constitutional
Rights of Teachers in Secondary Schools, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5 n.13 (1983).
120 See MOSHMAN, supra note 10, at 13; van Geel, supra note 15, at 240-47; Norman
B. Lichtenstein, Children, the Schools, and the Right to Know: Some Thoughts at the Schoolhouse
Gate, 19 U.S.F. L. REV. 91, 100 (1985); Stern supra note 10, at 494-96. But see Freeman,
supra note 115, at 8-9 (arguing that neither Meyer nor Pierce are in any way related to
students' free speech rights).
121 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97.
122 Id. at 401.
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ciate." s
However, the Court found that Nebraska's particular prohibition,
as applied to this teacher, took its inculcative agenda too far by
violating the substantive due process doctrine that held sway at the
time. 24 The Court found that the statute ran afoul of the doc-
trine by interfering with the student's freedom to acquire useful
knowledge, the parents' right to direct the upbringing of their off-
spring, the teacher's right to teach, and the parents' and teacher's
right to contract with each other for the latter's instructional
services. 2 ' The Court indicated that such interference with due
process rights could only pass constitutional muster if the inter-
ference were reasonably related to some legitimate governmental
end. 26 The Court held that the statute served no such end since
Nebraska could show no emergency necessitating that its residents
have a ready comprehension of political issues and since the stat-
ute served no other real purpose.27 Cast in broader terms, Meyer
stands for the proposition that while state governments may "go
very far, indeed"2 ' to improve the moral quality of its younger
citizenry, they may not go so far as to stand in the way of
children's acquisition of knowledge from private providers."s
123 Id. at 401-02. It is interesting to note that the Court expressed dismay, not with
Nebraska's aim of conforming its children into "a homogenous people," but only with
the "means adopted" to that end. Id. at 402. See Leora Harpaz, A Paradigm of First
Amendment Dilemmas: Resolving Public School Library Censorship Disputes, 4 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 1, 35 (1981).
124 In brief, substantive due process, as it was understood when Meyer was decided, is
a theory fashioned by the Supreme Court to protect mainly economic liberty rights, such
as the right to contract. Under the theory, states could not curtail protected economic
rights unless the curtailment represented an exercise of state police power in the interest
of the general welfare. TRIBE, supra note 119, at §§ 8-2 to 8-4. The theory was in vogue
during the so-called Lochner era spanning 1897 to 1937. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1904), for which the era was named, typifies the Court's application of substantive
due process at the time. In Lochner, the Court struck down a state statute which prohibit-
ed bakers from working more than sixty hours per week. The Court's rationale was that
the law interfered with the liberty of bakers and their employers to contract under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Both Meyer and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925), involved infringements of traditional economic liberty rights as well
as a more unusual substantive due process liberty right to be free of government impedi-
ments in the acquisition of education from private providers. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399400,
403; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-36. See also Bitensky, supra note 114, at 580-81.
125 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-403.
126 Id. at 399-400.
127 Id. at 401-03.
128 Id. at 401.
129 Harpaz, supra note 123, at 34-35; David Schuman, Comment, The Political Commu-
nity, The Individual, and Control of Public School Curriculum, 63 OR. L. REv. 309, 311
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Two years later, in Pierce, the Court relied upon substantive
due process to invalidate an Oregon law that required most
school-age children to attend public, rather than private
schools. 3 Again, the Court showed receptivity to values inculca-
tion in the schools: "No question is raised concerning the power
of the State reasonably to regulate all schools .... to require ...
that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic dis-
position, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship
must be taught ... ..'13 But even as the Justices acknowledged
the state's legitimate interest in values inculcation in the schools,
the Court cautioned that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of
the State"' and predicated its holding on the lack of a reason-
able relation between legitimate state ends and a law that would
"standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only."
3
1
In other words, the state may direct that both public and
private schools inculcate their students with certain state-approved
values relating to patriotism and good citizenship so long as stu-
dents are allowed to repudiate public schools altogether and ob-
tain education in private schools where, presumably, additional
values and outlooks might also be taught.Y In Meyer and Pierce
the Court assumed that "to inculcate or not to inculcate" is really
not the question; rather, the question, reduced to its essentials, is
how "to inculcate constitutionally and not to inculcate unconstitu-
tionally" at the same time."'
(1984). Cf Hunter, supra note 119, at 6-7 (observing that the Meyer Court recognized the
authority of the state to regulate curriculum).
130 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530-31, 534-36 (1925).
131 Id. at 534.
132 Id. at 535.
.133 Id. at 535.
134 Levin, supra note 49, at 1651-53; Schuman, supra note 129, at 311. But see Mark
G. Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First
Amendment, 57 Tnx. L. REv. 863, 888-91 (1979) (theorizing that Pierce should be interpret-
ed to limit rather than legitimize governmental authority to inculcate elementary and
secondary level students).
135 See Stephen Arons & Charles Lawrence, III, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A
First Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 309, 317-20 (1980);
Senhauser, supra note 115, at 950, 952; van Geel, supra note 15, at 240-42; cf. John H.
Robinson, Why Schooling Is So Controversial in America Today, 3 NOTRE DAME'J.L ETHics &
PUB. PoLy' 519, 524 (1988) (noting that even though Meyer and Pierce placed limits on
the government's inculcative function in the schools, both cases recognized the fact that
states retain considerable discretion to shape curriculum). But see Freeman, supra note
115, at 6-8 (opining that Meyer and Pierce concern only the economic rights of private
schools or teachers under early substantive due process doctrine).
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While Meyer and Pierce recognized in dicta that public schools
should have authority to inculcate values, the factual posture of
the cases did not allow for instruction concerning the constitu-
tional parameters of that authority. The opportunity for such a
disquisition came with the litigation of West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette,"s after the Court had inaugurated two doc-
trinal shifts that significantly altered constitutional jurisprudence
from what it had been when Meyer and Pierce were decided. First,
the Court repudiated the brand of substantive due process which
had served as the analytical framework for the two earlier deci-
sions.' Second, the Court made the First Amendment applica-
ble to the states by means of "incorporation" through the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."8 This undoubtedly ac-
counts for the fact that, unlike Meyer and Pierce, the Barnette deci-
sion is expressly predicated upon Free Speech Clause princi-
ples.
13 9
The challenge in Barnette was to West Virginia statutes that re-
quired all schools to provide courses of study instilling American-
ism and that authorized punishment for children's noncompliance
with implementing regulations issued by boards of education.40
Plaintiffs also challenged one such regulation that required public
school children to salute the American flag or else suffer penal-
ties, including expulsion. 4' According to the regulation, the pur-
pose of the compelled salute was to create a proclivity toward
"national unity"' during children's "formative period in the de-
velopment in citizenship."' While agreeing that national unity is
a legitimate value for public school officials to foster by persuasion
or example, the Court rejected compulsion as a means to this end
136 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940)).
137 Lochner era substantive due process ended in 1937. West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See also TRIBE, supra note 14, § 8-2.
138 Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Gitdow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925); 2 ROTUNDA & NOW, supra note 15, § 15.6. Gitlow was decided on June 8, 1925
and Pierce was decided on June 1, 1925.
139 Bamette, 319 U.S. at 639.
140 Id. at 625, 626 & n.1, 629 & n.5.
141 Id. at 626 & n.2, 627-29. The plaintiffs refused to salute the flag because it con-
travened their religious beliefs as Jehovah's Witnesses. Id. at 629. School officials expelled
students of this faith for their refusal and threatened to send the children to reformato-
ries. School officials also prosecuted the parents of the students for causing delinquency.
Id. at 630.
142 Id. at 627 n.2.
143 Id. at 627-28 n.2.
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in the school context and struck down the requirement as a vio-
lation of the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause.' The
Court's rationale was that officially compelling the salute was the
equivalent of officially compelling speech and just as constitution-
ally defective under the clause as governmental silencing of
speech.' The Court also reasoned that freedom of thought, as
the fount of free speech, comes within the ambit of the clause's
protection and is unconstitutionally stifled by a compelled salute
as well.
4 6
Unlike later cases,'47 the Court did not predicate its analysis
upon a classification of the salute as either curricular or
noncurricular;4 I that point is left vague in Justice Jackson's ma-
jority opinion. Because the distinction plays a significant role in
modern free speech jurisprudence,'49  commentators have at-
tempted to classify the salute retrospectively despite the Court's
silence on the matter. The commentators who take the position
that the salute was not part of the curriculum 5 ' do, in fact, have
some support for their interpretation in the Barnette majority opin-
144 Id. at 640-42.
145 Id. at 631-34, 642.
146 Id. at 637, 640. The Court expressed concern for the preservation of "freedom of
mind" and cautioned that schools must not "strangle the free mind at its source." Id. at
637. See Yudof, supra note 134, at 891; see also Stern, supra note 10, at 496.
147 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262, 266, 271 (1988) (uphold-
ing school's restriction of student expression that occurred as part of the journalism cur-
riculum and that was incompatible with the school's educational mission); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677, 685 (1986) (upholding school's punishment of
student expression that occurred as "part of a school-sponsored educational program" and
that undermined the school's educational mission); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Commu-
nity Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969) (predicating analysis on the Court's finding that
the case did not concern expression intruding upon "the work of the schools").
148 The word "curriculum" has two definitions relevant here: "1: the whole body of
courses offered by an educational institution or one of its branches" and "3: all planned
school activities including besides courses of study organized play, athletics, dramatics,
clubs, and home-room program." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 557
(3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S THIRD]. Some lower federal courts have recognized
that even nonclassroom activities can be part of the school curriculum. See, e.g., Seyfried
v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding that a school play is part of the
curriculum); ABC League v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 530 F. Supp. 1033,
1040 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (deciding that an interscholastic athletics program is curricular),
rev'd on other grounds, 682 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1982); Matute v. Carson Long Inst., 160 F.
Supp. 827, 828 (M.D. Pa. 1958) (classifying a varsity football program as curricular).
149 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 147.
150 Stern, supra note 10, at 497. See Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Im-
plied Political Establishment Clause 67 CAL L. REV. 1104, 1135 (1979); Sheldon H.
Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching. The Scope of Judicial Review,
18 WAYNE L. REV. 1479, 1504 (1972).
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ion" Justice Jackson expressly noted that the board of education
did not adopt the salute because it was thought to have education-
al worth.' Those commentators who accept the salute as an ele-
ment of a curricular program'52 probably have the better argu-
ment, though. The salute was a mandatory, school-sponsored exer-
cise, integrated into the school day, and intended to implement
West Virginia's legislatively proclaimed pedagogical goals of fur-
thering appreciation of Americanism and developing sentiments
supportive of national unity. 53 The Court itself refers to national
unity as a proper lesson for public schools to teach their pupils, as
long as the methodology is not offensive to the Free Speech
Clause.'54 The salute, therefore, was certainly not extracurricu-
lar "'55 and probably not cocurricular.' 6 Were the Barnette suit to
arise today, there is every reason to believe that the salute would
fall under the rubrics of "the work of the schools"'57 or "the
schools['] basic educational mission," 5' phrases used by the
Court in more modern decisions to denote curricular or formal
schooling activities.5 9
That the Barnette Court perceived no need to distinctly catego-
rize the salute is understandable in light of the fact that this was
151 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 631 n.12.
152 Hunter, supra note 119, at 12. Cf Goldstein, supra note 115, at 1350-51 (treating
the flag salute as impermissible methodology for achieving that part of the curricular
agenda conveying love of country); Rebell, supra note 22, at 300-02 (dealing with the
salute as a device for accomplishing part of the academic program); Shuman, supra note
129, at 316 (assuming that Barnette permits teaching Americanism through techniques
other than a compulsory flag salute).
153 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625, 626 & nn.1-2, 627-628, 629 & n.5.
154 Id. at 640.
155 "Extracurricular" is defined as "1: outside a regular curriculum: not falling within
the scope of a regular curriculum; specif, of or relating to officially or semi-officially ap-
proved and usu. organized student activities ... connected with the students' school and
usu. carrying no academic credit." WEBSTER'S THIRD, supra note 148, at 806. The salute is
undoubtedly less akin to student activities merely "connected" with the school and more
an aspect of a curricular program to which the school assigns academic credit (i.e., a
program in American studies).
156 "Cocurricular" is defined as being "outside of but usu. complementing the regular
curriculum - usu. contrasted with extracurricular." WEBSTER'S THIRD, supra note 148, at
437. It is a closer question whether the flag salute at issue in Barnette was curricular or
cocurricular. In light of the fact that the resolution instituting the salute was intended to
implement a state-wide educational program, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the
salute was an element of West Virginia's required curriculum in Americanism.
157 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
158 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).
159 See Roe, supra note 101, at 1272 n.4 (referring to these phrases as the Court's de-
scription of the schools' work or operations).
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an early encounter with the constitutionality of values inculcation
under the Free Speech Clause."8 As it turns out, the absence of
such analytical refinements is consistent with Justice Jackson's
articulation of a general concern about the evils of government
indoctrination, regardless of the setting in which the indoctrina-
tion may be imposed. Justice Jackson warned: "[i]f there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion .... "161 In
hindsight it may be wondered whether with these words, eloquent
and inspiring though they are, Justice Jackson went too far in
embellishing the holding. Barnette clearly stands for the proposi-
tion that states may not force public school children to salute the
American flag. 2 Does it also stand for the much broader propo-
sition that public schools must be neutral on all subjects where a
difference of opinion is possible? In the Supreme Court's view, is
nonneutrality always tantamount to orthodoxy? That this may have
been exactly what the warning was meant to convey is also suggest-
ed by the Barnette Court's stated vision of ideal public schooling:
"Free public education, if faithful to the ideal of secular in-
struction and political neutrality, will not be partisan or enemy of
any class, creed, party, or faction."16
The logic of these embellishments, read literally, does seem to
be that in order for the public schools to avoid orthodoxy, they
must maintain painstaking neutrality with respect to all "matters of
opinion"'-matters which may, incidentally, be found through-
out the curriculum at the elementary and secondary levels.'65 Yet,
160 See Freeman, supra note 115, at 9. The Court had previously dealt with the con-
stitutionality of the compelled flag salute in public schools in Minersville Sch. Dist. v.
Cobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). Gobitis, in upholding the flag salute, reaffirmed several prior
per curiam dispositions of the same issue by the Supreme Court. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 592
n.2 (affirming Johnson v. Deerfield, 306 U.S. 621 (1938); Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 306
U.S. 621 (1938); Hering v. State Bd. of Educ., 303 U.S. 624 (1937); Leoles v. Landers,
302 U.S. 656 (1937)). Barnette had the effect of overruling obitis and the per curiam
decisions. Barnette 319 U.S. at 642.
161 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
162 "We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and
pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of in-
tellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to
reserve from all official control." Id. See Harpaz, supra note 123, at 36.
163 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
164 Arons & Lawrence, supra note 135, at 318-19; Mary Harter Mitchell, Secularism in
Public Education: The Constitutional Issues, 67 B.U. L. REV. 603, 708 (1987); Rebell, supra
note 22, at 300-01. See Stem, supra note 10, at 496-97.
165 Subjects involving "matters of opinion" are common fare for students in public
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if neutrality is the only alternative to orthodoxy, how is it possible
that in the space of the same opinion Justice Jackson could also
write that "[n]ational unity as an end which officials may foster by
persuasion and example is not in question"?" Surely national
unity is not a values-neutral idea; its worth and wisdom, while
accepted by most Americans, is a matter upon which other Amer-
icans may conceivably differ. 67 Nor does the fact that persuasion
and example are used in lieu of a compelled flag salute allay the
concerns raised by the Court's proscription of official orthodoxy in
politics and its abhorrence of public schools that would be parti-
san. It may be safely ventured that as students we have all been
taught by persuasion and example-with the concomitant expecta-
tion that we would absorb and retain our lessons so as to be able
to repeat them on examinations." This common pedagogical
elementary and secondary schools. For example, many states require their public schools
to teach citizen education courses that cover such debatable topics as the dangers of
Communism and the benefits of a free enterprise system. Gordon, supra note 54, at 561,
564, 566. Nor is it unusual for public schools to include controversial offerings in sex
education as part of their curricula. Id. at 561, 566-69. Even the teaching of seemingly
innocuous, traditional courses may involve highly sensitive "matters of opinion." The study
of literature has provided much fertile soil for disputes over values. See, e.g., Board of
Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality
opinion); JOAN DELFATrORE, WHAT JOHNNY SHOULDN'T READ 1-2, 49 (1992) (observing
that high school literary anthologies routinely delete material pertaining to sex and criti-
cal of religion from Shakespeare's plays and noting that poetry written for an elementary
school level audience has been a focus of parental protest). According to some, even the
study of arithmetic may be value-laden. MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 232
(1983); Wright, supra note 10, at 77 n.98. Moreover, there is always the possibility that a
hidden ideological curriculum, rife with "matters of opinion," operates implicitly, on a
subconscious level, upon students. See, e.g., APPLE, supra note 49, at 61-64 (contending
that there is a hidden curriculum in the schools meant to perpetuate society's class struc-
ture); Levin, supra note 49, at 1668 (noting that school rules and regulations implicitly
transmit certain values and thereby create a passive mindset in students); see also
JANOWrTZ, supra note 49, at 163-66 (asserting that if there is a hidden curriculum in the
schools, it is probably in the outlook of social studies and civics teachers).
166 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640.
167 Historically, the concept of national unity has not always predominated in the
United States. The Civil War is, of course, the most vivid illustration of the phenomenon.
One century later, in the 1960s and 1970s, national unity succumbed to widespread dis-
sension over the United States role in the war in Vietnam. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510 n.4 (1969); JANOWITZ, supra note 49, at
107. Likewise, certain groups within the United States have pursued a separatist ideology
or life style. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210 (1972) (describing Amish
adherence to a "life aloof from the world"); JANOWITZ, supra note 49, at 112-14 (analyz-
ing the movement for black nationalism).
168 Stephen E. Gottlieb, In the Name of Patriotism: The Constitutionality of "Bending"
History in Public Secondary Schools, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 497, 551 (1987). See also Axons &
Lawrence, supra note 135, at 334, 336 (criticizing standardized testing as forcing the test
taker to express agreement with "the values and world view of the tester").
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approach arguably may do more violence to freedom of thought
and expression than a compelled salute insofar as the materials
which must be internalized and mastered are more voluminous
and complex and require more of a mental commitment than a
simple salute.69
Perhaps the internal inconsistencies of Barnette can be mini-
mized if the holding is narrowly construed, i.e., if the majority
opinion is read merely to invalidate, under the Free Speech
Clause, compelled flag salutes in the public elementary and sec-
ondary schools, and nothing more. This explanation does not,
however, seem very satisfactory. If Barnette is to be taken with the
same seriousness with which it apparently was rendered, then it
must be the state's compulsion of public school students to articu-
late the official line on a matter of opinion that is constitutionally
objectionable-not just the particular compulsion to demonstrate
love of country through a flag salute. 7 A more plausible expla-
nation may be that Barnette perpetuates under the Free Speech
Clause the duality first identified in Meyer and Pierce under the
Due Process Clause: the public schools must both inculcate and
not inculcate, by inculcating constitutionally and not inculcating
unconstitutionally.' Understood in this sense, Barnette signifies
that neutrality is not the only alternative to orthodoxy inasmuch as
some values inculcation, such as the promotion of patriotism by
techniques other than a forced flag salute, is permissible under
the Free Speech Clause.72
That this analysis does not mistake the meaning of Barnette as
tolerant of some values inculcation is born out by the Court's
subsequent decisions. For example, if neutrality were the only
169 Arons & Lawrence, supra note 135, at 334, 336-37; Gordon, supra note 54, at 556;
Gottlieb, supra note 168, at 551-52.
170 Freeman, supra note 115, at 10; Hunter, supra note 119, at 12;, Schuman, supra
note 129, at 316; Senhauser, supra note 115, at 952; Shiffrin, supra note 15, at 566-68;
Malcolm Stewart, The First Amendment, the Public Schools, and The Inculcation of Community
Values, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 23, 74 (1989). But see van Geel, supra note 15, at 244.
171 Freeman, supra note 115, at 10; Levin, supra note 49, at 1649 & n.8; Mitchell,
supra note 164, at 708; Senhauser, supra note 115, at 951; van Geel, supra note 15, at
244; Yudof, supra note 134, at 891; Walter A. Kamiat, Note, State Indoctrination and the
Protection of Non-State Voices in the Schools: Justifying a Prohibition of School Libray Censorship,
35 STAN. L. REV. 497, 521 (1983).
172 Freeman, supra note 115, at 10; Goldstein, supra note 115, at 1351; Levin, supra
note 49, at 1652-53, 1657-58; Rebell, supra note 22, at 301; Shiffrin, supra note 15, at
567-68; Stewart, supra note 170, at 73-74; van Geel, supra note 15, at 244; Yudof, supra
note 134, at 891. See Schuman, supra note 129, at 316.
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alternative to orthodoxy, how is it possible that in Brown v. Board
of Educationt7l the Court could mandate, pursuant to the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, 4 an end to racial-
ly segregated public schooling" without simultaneously casting a
"pall of orthodoxy" 76 upon the classroom? Although the case did
not involve a free speech claim, Brown is of interest here because
it is unquestionably a values-laden mandate to the public schools,
compelling active adherence by students and school personnel to
a nonneutral message about race relations. 7 That the values les-
son of their decision was not far from the Justices' minds in Brown
is apparent from the express language of the Court's opinion: "It
[education] is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is
a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural val-
ues . ".. The Brown Court did not allude to any First
Amendment obstacles in rendering its decision. 9
Ambach v. Norwick'8° is even more to the point. At issue in
this case was the claim that New York contravened the Equal Pro-
tection and Free Speech Clauses by prohibiting the employment in
public elementary and secondary schools of teachers who were
aliens and who refused to seek U.S. citizenship.' The assump-
tion underlying the prohibition was that such aliens would not
teach acceptable values.82  The Court upheld the statute as
against the equal protection claim because New York had a legiti-
mate interest, to which the employment ban was rationally relat-
ed, 83 in developing students' "perceptions and values"8 4 and in
molding "the attitudes of students toward government, the political
173 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
174 The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall "deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
175 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-96.
176 The phrase comes from the majority opinion in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967), stating that "the First Amendment ...does not tolerate laws
that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."
177 Bruce C. Hafen, Schools as Intellectual and Moral Associations, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV.
605, 60910. See Arons & Lawrence, supra note 135, at 323, 349; cf STEPHEN ARONS, COM-
PELLING BELIEF 213-14 (1983) (discussing government regulation against racism in the
schools as conveying values).
178 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
179 Id. passim.
180 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
181 Id. at 69.
182 Id. at 81 n.14.
183 Id. at 79-81.
184 Id. at 78-79.
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process, and a citizen's social responsibilities."'" Furthermore, "a
State properly may regard all teachers as having an obligation to
promote civic virtues and understanding in their classes, regardless
of the subject taught,""= especially "values necessary to the main-
tenance of a democratic political system .... ""
The Ambach majority did not raise the spectre of government
imposed orthodoxy and betrayed no anxiety whatsoever that the
employment prohibition might contravene free speech principles.
Indeed, the Court characterized the alien teachers' free speech
claim as "wide of the mark""s because, if given credence, it
"would bar any effort by, the State to promote particular values
and attitudes toward government."" 9 Even Justice Blackmun, in
dissent, took pains to make clear "that the inculcation of funda-
mental values by our public schools is necessary to the mainte-
nance of a democratic political system." 9 '
While Brown and Ambach generally reinforce the constitutional
legitimacy of values inculcation in public elementary and second-
ary schools, neither case called upon the Court to decide the
constitutionality of a curricular decision to inculcate values. In that
sense, Brown and Ambach are somewhat attenuated from the pre-
cise issue presented in this Article and, arguably, in Barnette of
whether public schools may validly marshall their curricula to the
task of values inculcation under the Free Speech Clause. The
Court would reach that issue at a later date.'9 ' In the interim,
however, it decided two .more cases which also concern the consti-
tutionality under the Free Speech Clause of values inculcation in
the public schools, albeit in a noncurricular context, and which
contribute to understanding the evolution of the Court's thinking
in this area. As in Barnette, the Court in these cases, Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School Distric92 and Board of Educa-
tion, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico,'93 con-
tinued the dichotomous approach to analyzing the constitutionality
185 Id. at 79.
186 Id. at 80.
187 Id. at 77.
188 Id. at 79 n.10.
189 Id. at 79 n.10.
190 Id. at 86 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
191 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No.
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). See infra text accompanying notes 232-80.
192 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
193 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
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of values inculcation under the Free Speech Clause and ruled so
as to give freer play to that part of the analysis solicitous of
students' free expression rights.
Tinker had its genesis when principals of Des Moines' public
schools suspended three students for wearing black armbands to
school for the purpose of protesting American prosecution of the
war in Vietnam.' The students claimed that the suspensions vio-
lated the Free Speech Clause. The U.S. Supreme Court sided with
the students, observing that students do not "shed their consti-
tutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate."'95 The Court reasoned that the students' wearing of
the armbands was their "silent, passive expression of opinion,"96
a form of expression protected by the clause. The Court ruled
that such protected student expression could only be curtailed by
the schools if, at the very least, the expression could reasonably
have led school authorities to anticipate substantial disruption of
the work of the school or interference with the rights of other stu-
dents.'97 Since the record contained no facts demonstrating that
the principals might reasonably have forecast that wearing
armbands would cause such disruption or interference and since
no disruption or interference actually occurred, the Court held
194 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
195 Id. at 506.
196 Id. at 508.
197 Id. at 509, 514; Diamond, supra note 99, at 480; Thomas C. Fischer, "Whatever
Happened to Mmy Beth Tinker" and Other Sagas in the Academic "Marketplace of Ideas", 23
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 351, 355 (1993); Hafen, supra note 99, at 691. Professor
Sheldon Nahmod opines that the Tinker test of the constitutionality of public school
regulation of student speech consists of two different tests, one focusing on the rule-mak-
ing function of the schools and the other pertaining to school officials' adjudication of
student behavior. Nahmod, supra note 150, at 1483-84. According to Professor Nahmod's
interpretation, a challenge to rule-making in this context is a facial challenge to a school
speech regulation and, under Tinker, the constitutionality of the rule should turn on
whether school officials could have reasonably forecast that the student speech would
disrupt the work of the schools or interfere with the rights of others. A challenge to a
school adjudication that student speech should be punished is a challenge to a school
speech regulation as applied and, under Tinker, the constitutionality of the adjudication
should hinge on whether the speech disrupted the work of the schools or interfered with
the rights of others. Nahmod, supra note 150, at 1483-84. Professor Thomas C. Fischer
analyzes Tinker in a somewhat similar vein, equating a challenge to rule-making to a
challenge to the school's prior restraint of student speech and requiring application of
"the Tinker 'forecast' rule." Fischer, supra, at 352 n.6. Nevertheless, some commentators
assume that Tinker posits only one test of the constitutionality of public school regulation
of student speech, which is simply whether the speech actually disrupts school operations
or intrudes upon the rights of others. Dienes & Connolly, supra note 115, at 357; Rebell,
supra note 22, at 304.
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that the suspensions were an unconstitutional contraction of stu-
dent rights under the First Amendment.'
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court offered some
reflections that, taken out of context, would seem to augur a
Court less disposed to accept the constitutionality of values incul-
cation. The opinion's quotes from Keyishian v. Board of Regents"
stress that the classroom is uniquely a "marketplace of ideas"2"
in which students should be exposed to a "robust exchange of
ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rath-
er] than through any kind of authoritative selection.""'2 " More-
over, in this ideational marketplace that is school, "students may
not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the
State chooses to communicate."
20 2
Although these are strong words, they have ultimately had a
limited impact on curricular values inculcation. Tinker, considered
as a whole and in historical context, cannot fairly be taken to
repudiate the proposition that some values inculcation by public
elementary and secondary schools is permissible under the Free
Speech Clause.2°3 The reason for the limited reach of Tinker re-
lates to the factual basis upon which that case was decided. Tinker
does not involve any attempt by school officials to inculcate values
through the curriculum. Rather, Tinker concerns student expres-
sion initiated by students on school premises but outside "the
work of the schools."2°  The accuracy of this interpretation is
198 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
199 385 U.S. 589 (1967). Keyishian concerned issues of academic freedom in the uni-
versity setting. See supra note 115 for a discussion as to why cases dealing with higher
education are not included among the precedents considered pertinent to this article.
200 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)).
201 Id.
202 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
203 Diamond, supra note 99, at 528; Gottlieb, supra note 168, at 516; Harpaz, supra
note 123, at 36; Roe, supra note 101, at 1278 & n.36; Senhauser, supra note 115, at 959.
See Stewart, supra note 170, at 30-32; cf. Freeman, supra note 115, at 14 (asserting that
Tinker supports the idea that school officials may engage in values inculcation as long as
they steer clear of "narrow political, partisan, or religious indoctrination"); Goldstein,
supra note 115, at 1351-55 (arguing that Tinker has no bearing on teacher control of
curriculum and that Tinker is incorrect if it does affect teacher control of curriculum);
Hafen, supra note 99, at 691 (noting that student expression at issue in Tinker was un-
connected to curriculum or even to extracurricular activities); van Geel, supra note 15, at
244, 245 & n.232 (suggesting that Tinker signifies that schools may inculcate values but
may not interfere with students' opportunity to hear alternative views from their peers).
But see Ingber, supra note 10, at 48 & n.192.
204 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
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confirmed by the circumstance that Tinker preceded not only
Ambach v. Norwick2°5 but also Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser°" and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,"7 the latter
two decisions upholding curricular values inculcation against stu-
dent Free Speech Clause claims.
Three years after Tinker, in Board of Education, Island Trees
Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico,2"' the Supreme Court had
occasion to decide the constitutionality, under the Free Speech
Clause, of public schools' removal from their libraries of certain
books which school officials considered "'anti-American, anti-Chris-
tian, anti-Sem[i]tic, and just plain filthy"' as well as a "'moral
danger"' to schoolchildren."°  An uncertain Court responded
with a plurality decision and seven separate opinions. Although
the disposition of the case, set forth in Justice Brennan's opinion
for the Court, was expressly limited to values inculcation contro-
versies that arise in connection with public school libraries and,
even then, only with regard to the removal of books from those
libraries,"' Pico is worthy of study. In their various opinions, the
Justices write at some length in dicta about public schools' author-
ity to engage in values inculcation in general. It is especially illu-
minating to compare the opinion of Justice Brennan with those of
Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger," for the three opin-
ions disclose a Court divided only with respect to the methodology
of identifying what type of values inculcation is constitutional;"
there is no disagreement with the proposition that some values
inculcation in the public elementary and secondary schools is
constitutional and desirable."'
205 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
206 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
207 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
208 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
209 Id. at 857 (quoting Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist.,
474 F. Supp. 387, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
210 Id. at 862-63, 871-72.
211 Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion does not differ substantially from the ap-
proach adopted by Justice Brennan. Pico, 457 U.S. at 875-82 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice White agrees with the lower appellate court that the case should not have been
decided on a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 883-84 (White, J., concurring). Justice
Powell's dissenting opinion views the plurality decision as an unwise intrusion of judicial
oversight into educational policy and rejects Justice Brennan's recognition of a First
Amendment right to receive ideas. Id. at 893-97 (Powell, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice
O'Connor's short dissenting opinion essentially echoes the Rehnquist dissent. Id. at 921
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
212 See infra notes 214-31 and accompanying text.
213 See infra notes 214-31 and accompanying text.
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Justice Brennan's opinion adjudged that if the school board
were removing the library books in order to limit access to ideas
with which the board disagreed, the removal would violate the
Free Speech Clause; if, however, the purpose of the removal were
merely to protect children from materials that were vulgar or
otherwise educationally unsuitable to their age, the removal would
be constitutional." 4 In reaching this result, Justice Brennan in-
voked the proposition that students should benefit from a quali-
fied First Amendment right to receive information and ideas from
existing public school library collections."' Whether Justice
Brennan would extend that righf beyond the library is unclear,1 6
especially since he acknowledges that outside the library the public
schools have a responsibility to inculcate certain values-a respon-
sibility that necessitates selectivity in conveying information to stu-
dents.
217
Such ambiguity is characteristic of the dicta in Justice
Brennan's opinion concerning the broader school setting. For
example, in some departure from Barnette, he wrote approvingly of
public schools' obligation to teach political values in the class-
room:
We are therefore in full agreement with petitioners that local
school boards must be permitted "to establish and apply their
curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values,"
and that "there is a legitimate and substantial community inter-
est in promoting respect for authority and traditional values be
they social, moral, or political.
21
Justice Brennan opines that in contrast to the school library,
214 Pico, 457 U.S. at 871-72.
215 Id. at 866-68.
216 The ambiguity of Justice Brennan's opinion on this score is readily apparent. He
refers to the "special characteristics of the school librar as making it an "especially ap-
propriate" place for recognition of students' right to receive information and ideas. Id. at
868. One possible implication of these words, which, incidentally, Justice Rehnquist re-
fused to draw, is that since the library is "especially" conducive to such recognition, other
places and/or activities in the schools might also serve as a locus for the right even
though they present a less appropriate milieu for exercise of the right. Id. at 910
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Yet, this implication is rendered dubious by Justice Brennan's
own caveat that "[pletitioners might well defend their claim of absolute discretion in
matters of curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate community values." Id. at
869. School officials' "absolute discretion" vis-a-vis curricular inculcation is difficult, if not
impossible, to reconcile with students' right to receive whatever information they want
through the curriculum.
217 Id. at 864, 869.
218 Id. at 864 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 10).
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where the purported First Amendment right to receive informa-
tion and ideas must be respected, "[p]etitioners might well defend
their claim of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by reli-
ance upon their duty to inculcate community values."1 9 Yet, in
the very same opinion Justice Brennan also makes the general
observation that "[o]ur Constitution does not permit the official
suppression of ideas"220 and repeats the refrain that the Free
Speech Clause does not permit schools to "cast a pall of ortho-
doxy over the classroom."221 Justice Brennan's opinion evinces
that he both accepted and repudiated values inculcation, without
explanation as to how these positions can be reconciled. The
latitude afforded by dicta may account for the inconclusive self-
contradiction. Nevertheless, the result is that in Pico, Justice
Brennan articulates a dichotomous approach that verges on the
unintelligible.22
Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion parts company with
the plurality opinion on the grounds that "virtually all educational
decisions necessarily involve 'political' determinations"" and that
those determinations are part and parcel of schools' broad discre-
tion to inculcate values integral to safeguarding a democratic polit-
ical system. 24 Based on this assumption, the Chief Justice is em-
phatic that the Court should not recognize children's free speech
right to receive all information and ideas from the public schools
which children desire;225 at the same time, he agrees with the
proposition laid down in Tinker that children do not abdicate their
First Amendment rights simply because they find themselves in the
custody of the public schools.2 26 Thus, although the Chief Justice
does not repudiate the dichotomous approach, he strikes a bal-
ance that, at least in tone, is favorably inclined toward upholding
values inculcation.
219 Id. at 869.
220 Id. at 871.
221 Id. at 870 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
222 Kamiat, supra note 171, at 510; Levin, supra note 49, at 1659 & n.61, 1660. See
Gottlieb, supra note 168, at 514-15; Ingber, supra note 10, at 54-55; van Geel, supra note
15, at 238-39; cf Roe, supra note 101, at 1281 (observing that Justice Brennan's Pico opin-
ion accepts the notion that public schools should inculcate those values that are essential
to a democratic society, but also warns the schools to refrain from exercising their
inculcative powers in a political or partisan way).
223 Pico, 457 U.S. at 890 (Burger, Cj., dissenting).
224 Id. at 889-90.
225 Id. at 888-89.
226 Id. at 886.
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Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion also accepts the general
proposition that children are not bereft of all free speech rights
while at school. 7 However, in Pico, Justice Rehnquist comes
close to abandoning the dichotomous approach. He would substi-
tute an approach that applies the Free Speech Clause less strin-
gently when the government acts as an educator rather than as a
sovereign."8 This approach acknowledges that when government
plays the role of educator at the elementary and secondary levels,
it necessarily and ideally inculcates values and engages in "the
selective conveyance of ideas."2" Justice Rehnquist asserts that
under the First Amendment, schooling at these levels cannot be
held to "any constitutionally required eclecticism in public educa-
tion," whether in the library or through the curriculum.'
Justice Rehnquist's dissent represents an innovation in the
analysis of values inculcation. In lieu of the Court's dichotomous
approach that may, after all, be a futile attempt to reconcile the
irreconcilable, Justice Rehnquist offers the simplicity of a two-part
test. Specifically, the constitutionality of values-laden, government-
imposed speech regulations depends first, on whether they are
imposed by the government acting as educator and, second, on
whether the government is regulating speech at the elementary
and secondary levels. If the answer to both of these questions is
affirmative, there is a strong inference that the values inculcation
achieved by the restraint is constitutional." In spite of the sim-
plicity of this analysis and the predictability which it would ostensi-
bly bring to determining the constitutionality of the schools'
inculcative functions, the Court has not opted to employ this test
in subsequent cases.
Indeed, soon after Pico, the Court resorted to the dichoto-
mous approach in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,2 2 a case
directly addressing the status under the Free Speech Clause of
curricular values inculcation by the public schools. In Fraser, a pub-
lic high school student was disciplined for making a lewd speech
nominating one of his peers for student elective office. The
speech, which described the nominee's qualifications by the use of
227 Id. at 910 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
228 Id. at 920.
229 Id. at 915.
230 Id. at 914..
231 See supra text accompanying notes 227-31.
232 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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an explicit sexual metaphor, was delivered during an assembly that
was part of a school-sponsored educational program in self-govern-
ment.23 As such, the nominating speech was a curricular exer-
cise"' or, to use the terminology from Tinker, "the wo)rk of the
schools."235
The speech was not without effect. Some of the six hundred
children in the audience hooted and yelled, others used gestures
to mimic the sexual acts represented in the metaphor and others
seemed bewildered.23 ' Because school authorities considered the
speech to be in violation of a school rule against "'obscene, pro-
fane language or gestures,' 237 the student was suspended for sev-
eral days and his name was deleted from a list of potential com-
mencement day speakers.2as
He filed suit in federal district court, arguing, among other
things, that these disciplinary measures impinged upon his First
Amendment free speech rights. 239 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, affirming the judgment of the district court in
favor of the student, held that his speech was indistinguishable
from the protest armband in Tinker.2' The Court of Appeals re-
jected the school district's contention that, incident to its authority
over the curriculum, the school also had the power to regulate




The U.S. Supreme Court, in what has become almost a ritual
in values inculcation cases, acknowledged that students do not
"shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech ... at the
schoolhouse gate."242 But, the Court refused to apply Tinker's
233 Id. at 677-78.
234 The majority opinion repeatedly refers to Fraser's nominating speech as part of
the formal educational program or curriculum. "The assembly was part of a school-spon-
sored educational program in self-government." 1d. at 677. Fraser's utterances were made
"before an official high school assembly." 1d. at 681. The First Amendment does not pre-
vent schools from punishing student speech that would "undermine the school's basic
educational mission." Id. at 685.
235 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
236 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678. But see Traci B. Edwards, Comment, First Amendment Rights
in Public Schools: Bethel School District v. Fraser, 12 OKLA. CrY U. L. REV. 907, 926-27
(1987) (contending that the hoots and yells were merely appreciative outpourings and that
very few students simulated the sexual activities alluded to by Fraser).
237 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678 (quoting the applicable Bethel High School disciplinary
rule).
238 Id. at 678.
239 Id. at 679.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 680.
242 Id. at 680 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
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standard for assessing the constitutionality of public school limita-
tions on student expression under the Free Speech Clause to
Fraser.24 In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger distin-
guishes Tinker from Fraser on two grounds. First, the penalties
imposed in Fraser had no relation to any political viewpoint where-
as the punishment meted out in Tinker was in reaction to a pro-
test against American military involvement in Vietnam.244 Second,
the nominating speech in Fraser was part of the school's academic
program while the armband incident in Tinker was not part of the
"work of the schools." 245
Fraser thus develops further the dichotomous approach that
the .Court initiated in Meer, Pierce and Barnette. In Fraser the Court
makes the customary bow of obeisance to students' individual free
speech rights while holding that the school district's regulation of
that speech survives a Free Speech Clause challenge. 46 This rep-
resents a development of the Court's prior analysis in the sense
that Fraser gleans from Barnette and Tinker a general rule of thumb
that is implicit in the three cases read together: public schools
may regulate nonpolitical student speech that is part of the curric-
ulum provided the regulation is directed at inculcating values
other than political ones;2 47 public schools may restrict student
speech that is not part of the curriculum if school officials reason-
ably foresee that the speech will substantially disrupt school activi-
ties or interfere with the rights of others.2 4' That the Fraser Court
thought it was validating the constitutionality of nonpolitical values
inculcation is made clear not only by the Court's contrast of the
off-color nominating speech with the politically charged antiwar
protest," but also by the Court's characterization of the sanc-
503, 506 (1969)).
243 Id. at 685-86. See Edwards, supra note 236, at 920; Roe, supra note 101, at 1283-
84; Senhauser, supra note 115, at 973, 976. But see Royal C. Gardner, III, Note, Protecting
a School's Interest in Value Inculcation to the Detriment of Student's Free Expression Rights: Bethel
School District v. Fraser, 28 B.C. L. REV. 595, 598 (1987) (contending that Fraser "expands
the Tinker concept of substantial disruption of the educational process to include speech
which disrupts the school's value inculcation purpose").
244 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680.
245 Id. at 680.
246 Id. at 685.
247 Id. at 680, 685.
248 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509, 514
(1969).
249 "The marked distinction between the political 'message' of the armbands in Tinker
and the sexual content of respondent's speech in this case seems to have been given
little weight by the Court of Appeals." Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680.
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tions imposed on the student orator.5° According to the Court,
these sanctions, rather than suppressing a political viewpoint,
served the purportedly nonpolitical purpose of inculcating civility
and consideration for the sensibilities of other people." t
While Fraser brings some closure to the issue of whether pub-
lic schools may inculcate nonpolitical values by controlling school-
sponsored or curricular student speech, the decision also creates
many new ambiguities and leaves many preexisting questions unan-
swered.25 May public schools always regulate nonpolitical student
speech that is part of the curriculum so as to inculcate nonpolit-
ical values? If not, what are the factual circumstances that would
cause such regulation to run afoul of the Free Speech Clause?
Must the student speech contain sexual references for it to be so
regulated?23 May the public schools never regulate political stu-
dent speech that is part of the curriculum so as to inculcate politi-
cal values, and, if not, what is the standard for defining constitu-
tional regulation of political expression in the schools? Finally,
how should "political values" be defined?
The Fraser majority plainly regarded civility, understood as an
absence of sexual references, to be a nonpolitical value. Yet, the
appellate court below had been concerned that preservation of
such civility would "increase the risk of cementing white, middle-
class standards .... "254 This concern highlights the elusiveness
250 "Unlike the sanctions imposed on the students wearing armbands in Tinker, the
penalties imposed in this case were unrelated to any political viewpoint." Id. at 685.
251 Id. at 681, 683, 685. The Court emphasized that in the public schools consider-
ation for the sensibilities of others is a particularly strong justification for upholding
school control of sexually explicit student speech that "could well be seriously damaging
to its less mature audience." Id. at 683-84. See Gardner, supra note 243, at 597.
252 See, e.g., Dienes & Connolly, supra note 115, at 370-71 (pointing out that the
Fraser Court did not indicate whether "judicial deference toward suppression of 'indecent
speech' will be limited to sexual offensiveness in academic settings"); Bruce C. Hafen,
Comment, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DuKE
L. J. 685, 690-91 (seeing Fraser as a "potentially significant departure from Tinker" or, in
the alternative, as adding "little to the Tinker-era standards"); see also Edwards, supra note
236, at 929 (asserting that the Fraser Court may be understood to have objected to the
content of the student's speech without a constitutional rationale or, in the alternative, to
the time, place and manner of the student's speech); Gardner, supra note 243, at 616
(characterizing Fraser as propounding a vague values inculcation standard for ascertaining
the constitutionality of public school restrictions on student speech).
253 E.g., Dienes & Connolly, supra note 115, at 370; Roe, supra note 101, at 1285
n.83. One commentator has conjured up the "ideal test case" after Fraser it "would in-
volve non-lewd, non-indecent, non-vulgar speech . . . that could reasonably be thought to
detectably undermine the school's basic and legitimate educational mission, while at the
same time not posing a substantial threat of an actual physical disruption." Wright, supra
note 10, at 74.
254 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680 (quoting Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d
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of separating that which is political from that which is nonpoliti-
cal. In equating political expression with antiwar protests but not
with a bawdy nominating speech the Fraser Court tacitly adopted a
narrow conception of the term "political."255 That the conception
is so narrow as to be unworkable is manifested by the Court's own
discourse on civility as a Value essential to maintaining a "demo-
cratic political system " " and a "civilized social order." " Taking
the Court at its word, then, public schools may constitutionally
teach the nonpolitical value of civility so as to prepare the citizen-
ry to perpetuate the two political values of democracy and social
order."8 The contradictatory nature of this formulation cannot
help but raise doubts about the soundness of the Court's attempt
under the Free Speech Clause to distinguish political from nonpo-
litical curricular speech by students. In Fraser the Court has argu-
ably misstepped in applying its dichotomous analysis 9 by relying
on false distinctions in order to determine how educators are to
inculcate constitutionally and not inculcate unconstitutionally at
the same time.
Nor do the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements on
the subject, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,i resolve the
questions left dangling in Fraser. In Kuhlmeier three former stu-
dents at Hazelwood East High School who also had been staff
members of the school newspaper brought suit against the school
district and variofis school personnel. The gravamen of the com-
1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985)).
255 There is a certain anomaly in the fact that although the Fraser Court categorized
the student's speech in that case as not involving any political viewpoint, the speech was,
in fact, given "in the context of a studentelection campaign." Fischer, supra note 197, at
377.
256 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 683.
257 Id. at 683.
258 As one commentator puts it, "the school board's attempt to inculcate the stan-
dards of 'decency' and 'civility' was seen [by the Court] not only as transmitting legiti-
mate character values, but also as supporting the political value of respect for the rights
of others in a democratic society." Rebell, supra note 22, at 307.
259 Some legal scholars have described the Fraser approach as a balancing test. Dienes
& Connolly, supra note 115, at 364; Edwards, supra note 236, at 919. See The Supreme
Court - Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 143, 276 (1988). Because this balancing at-
tempts to reconcile the tension between students' free speech rights and the public
schools' inculcative enterprise, the test incorporates and is a manifestation of the dichoto-
mous approach referred to in the text above. In an interesting twist, some commentators
have likened the Fraser balancing test to that used in Tinker on the theory that Fraser
characterizes "interference with inculcation of values as itself a material disruption of the
school's educational mission." The Supreme Court - Leading Cases, supra, at 276.
260 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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plaint was that school authorities violated the students' free speech
rights by deleting articles from the May 13, 1983 issue of the news-
paper.
261
The newspaper was produced as part of the school's journal-
ism curriculum. 2  In keeping with past practice, the journalism
teacher submitted page proofs of the May 13th edition to the
school principal for his review.26 ' The principal prohibited publi-
cation of two of the newspaper's six pages by withholding two arti-
cles. One of the articles explored the impact of divorce on stu-
dents at the school and the other described three Hazelwood East
students' pregnancies.2" The principal's reasons for this censor-
ship were to protect the privacy of the pregnant students who
might be identifiable from the text, shield the school's younger
students from inappropriate descriptions of sexual activity and
birth control, and maintain the privacy of a student's father who
was disparagingly portrayed in the article on divorce.6
The Court reasoned that the question before it was not
whether the Free Speech Clause requires public schools to tolerate
student speech unrelated to the curriculum, as in Tinker, but,
rather, whether the clause requires schools to tolerate student
speech that is part of the curriculum and thereby give the impres-
sion that the school endorses the contents of such speech.2" Be-
cause the school newspaper was curricular student speech, the
Court reasoned that Tinke's standard for judging the constitution-
ality of speech regulations did not govern. 267 The Kuhlmeier ma-
jority instead held "that educators do not offend the First Amend-
ment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of
student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
261 Id. at 262.
262 "This case concerns the extent to which educators may exercise editorial control
over the contents of a high school newspaper produced as part of the school's journal-
ism curriculum." Id. "Spectrum [the school newspaper] was written and edited by the
Journalism II class at Hazelwood East." Id. "The policy of school officials toward Spec-
trum was reflected in Hazelwood School Board Policy 348.51 and the Hazelwood East
Curriculum Guide. Board Policy 348.51 provided that '[s]chool sponsored publications are
developed within the adopted curriculum and its educational implications in regular class-
room activities.'" Id. at 268. "School officials did not deviate in practice from their policy
that production of Spectrum was to be part of the educational curriculum and a 'regular
classroom activit[y].'" Id.
263 Id. at 263.
264 Id. at 263-64.
265 Id. at 263.
266 Id. at 270-73.
267 Id. at 272-73.
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their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns."
26
With this holding, Kuhlmeier may have improved upon Fraser
by elucidating with more precision 26 9 the applicable standard for
268 Id. at 273. The Kuhlmeier Court also relied upon a nonpublic forum analysis in
reaching the holding. Id. at 267-71.
Under the forum doctrine, the courts assess the constitutionality, under the Free
Speech Clause, of governmental content-based regulations of expression by classifying the
type of forum in which the expression takes place and applying a standard of assessment
that varies with the classification. Public fora are places, such -as the streets and parks,
"which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and de-
bate." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Semi-
public fora are opened up by the government to the public for "expressive activity." Id.
at 45. Nonpublic fora are "not by tradition or designation a forum for public communi-
cation" and are not opened up for public expressive interchange. Id. at 46. Generally
speaking, the government must have a compelling interest in order to impose content-
based regulations on expression in public and semi-public fora; in nonpublic fora, such
government regulation need only be rational and viewpoint-neutral. Id at 45-46; Dienes &
Connolly, supra note 115, at 372 n.108; Gail Paulus Sorenson, The 'Public Forum Doctrine'
and its Application in School and College Cases, 20 J.L. & EDUC. 445, 446-49 (1991). See
generally TRIBE, supra note 14, § 12-24.
The nature of public schools, by itself, does not suffice to make them into either
public or semi-public fora. Sorenson, supra, at 455. But see Hafen, supra note 99, at 725
(arguing that the forum analysis should not apply at all to the schooling of immature
children). Indeed, Justice White's opinion for the Court in Kuhimeier effectively equated a
nonpublic forum classification with public school activities that are school-sponsored or
curricular. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 268-70. But see The Supreme Court - Leading Cases, supra
note 259, at 276 (contending that Kuhlmeier does not make clear "whether school spon-
sorship is somehow equated with nonpublic forum status"). The Court understandably
concluded, therefore, that the school could properly impose regulations meeting a rea-
sonableness standard on the content of student expression occurring as part of such
school activities. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 268-70.
Justice White's Kuhlmeier opinion has been interpreted to offer, in actuality, two
possible reasonableness standards, i.e., that in a nonpublic school forum government may
regulate speech content "in any reasonable manner," Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270, or in
any manner "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 484 U.S. at 273. The
Supreme Court - Leading Cases, supra note 259, at 276 n.50. See also Hafen, supra note
252, at 695 (noting that the majority opinion "was not entirely consistent" in explaining
the reasonableness standard). Professor Bruce Hafen proposes that "the larger [factual]
context of Hazelwood' suggests a rational basis standard that is not necessarily keyed to
educational justifications. Hafen, supra note 252, at 695-96. However, Justice White's opin-
ion in its entirety can lead to the opposite conclusion. Since the Court's holding is
grounded upon the fact that the school was regulating student speech so as to inculcate
certain values, it is just as logical to surmise that Justice White meant that such regula-
tion will be considered reasonable under nonpublic forum analysis only if it is "reason-
ably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273 (emphasis add-
ed). See Sorenson, supra note 268, at 453.
269 Those less confident about Kuhlmeier's improving effect have remarked: "[whereas
the Fraser opinion was disjointed and opaque, Justice White's opinion for the Court in
Hazelwood is painfully clear." Dienes & Connolly, supra note 115, at 371. See also J. Marc
Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, End of an Era? The Decline of Student Press Rights in the Wake
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determining the constitutionality, under the Free Speech Clause,
of school restraints on curriculum-related student speech. Even so,
the devil is in the details. What sorts of "legitimate pedagogical
concerns" justify schools in controlling such speech? In the con-
text of Kuhlmeier, the phrase "legitimate pedagogical concerns" ap-
pears to be a euphemism for values inculcation since, according to
the Court, the principal could excise the troublesome articles not
only to protect privacy and immature sensibilities, but also to in-
culcate, by the excision, the opposite of those values expressed in
the offending articles.27 And what values may a public school
properly inculcate through its curriculum under the Free Speech
Clause? The Kuhlneier decision offers an illustrative list which
seems to further obfuscate the dividing line between constitutional
and unconstitutional values inculcation. The Court states that
public schools may regulate curricular student speech so as to
disassociate themselves "from speech that is, for example, un-gram-
matical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or preju-
diced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audienc-
es."27 1 Moreover,
[a] school must also retain the authority to refuse to sponsor
student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate
drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise
inconsistent with 'the shared values of a civilized social
order' . . . or to associate the school with any position other
than neutrality on matters of political controversyY2
As in Barnett 73 and Fraser,274 the Court advises the schools both
to strive for neutrality on political matters and to ignore that ad-
vice-by teaching, for example, that students should shun preju-
dice or conduct inconsistent with civilized social order. It is easily
imagined that a bigot would take exception to the former value
and an anarchist would do the same with respect to the latter as
of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 DUKE L.J. 706, 719-28, 732; Colleen M.
Arnott, Comment, Constitutional Law - Public School Students' Frst Amendment Right of Ex-
pression Subject to Standard of Reasonableness - Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S.
Ct. 562 (1988), 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 851, 858-59 (1988); Eileen Libby, Note, The Su-
preme Court Further Restricts Student First Amendment Rights in Public Schools: The Future of
"Free Trade in Ideas" After Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 20 LOY. U. CHI. LJ. 145,
163-70 (1988).
270 Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270-73.
271 Id. at 271.
272 Id. at 272.
273 See supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text.
274 See supra notes 247-59 and accompanying text.
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being contrary to their moral codes and political views. In short,
Kuhlmeier reiterates the problem that plagued the Court in Barnette
and Fraser-how to make sense of the Court's dichotomous ap-
proach by making an understandable demarcation between consti-
tutional and unconstitutional values inculcation in public elemen-
tary and secondary school curricula. The Court in Kuhlmeier dodg-
es the problem by again offering guidance that, at least on its
face, is contradictory and confusing.
It remains to be seen whether the Court's dichotomous ap-
proach is a sophisticated, flexible response to a highly complex
problem or mere haphazard inconsistency-a failure by the Court
to enunciate a workable, reasoned standard. Whether because of
or in spite of the dichotomous approach, Fraser and Kuhmeier do,
however, represent some doctrinal progress. They provide a de-
finitive answer to the question first raised in Barnette as to whether
it is possible for public elementary and secondary schools to incul-
cate values through the curriculum without violating the Free
Speech Clause. The Fraser and Kuhlmeier Courts' affirmative answer
additionally makes some limited headway in clarifying which values
the schools may constitutionally inculcate. Certainly Fraser establish-
es that schools may use curricular activities to inculcate civility,
especially as that value relates to avoidance of profanity, vulgarity
and lewdness.275 Kuhlmeier makes equally clear that schools may
curricularly inculcate the value of respect for the privacy of oth-
ers.27 Fraser and Kuhmeier, particularly when read in light of Pico,
also leave no doubt that schools may deny students exposure to
values that are inappropriate to their age group."
This progress is somewhat tempered by the fact that the
Court's holdings in Fraser and Kuhlmeier reveal only a few of the
values that may be constitutionally inculcated. The Court's reti-
cence is, of course, appropriate since federal court holdings
should not cover more ground than the dispute in each case re-
quires. Nor is it feasible for the Court to identify every such value.
Nevertheless, the abbreviated list yielded by the Fraser and
Kuhlmeier holdings leaves a large grey area as to which other values
may be constitutionally acceptable for inculcative purposes. The
Court's more expansive dicta concerning the acceptability of a
variety of ambiguous and inconsistent values deepens rather than
275 See supra text accompanying notes 251, 253, 258.
276 See supra text accompanying note 270.
277 See supra text accompanying notes 214, 250-51, 271.
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dispels the haze. The reader need only refer back to the Court's
uneven treatment of political values to illustrate the difficulty: as a
general matter public schools are to avoid inculcating political
values while they are also expected to inculcate specific political
values such as a belief in the American political system.
In spite of these problems, the Court may, in the final analy-
sis, have exercised considerable wisdom in crafting the Fraser and
Kuhlmeier holdings and the lists of judicially approved values that
appear in the various cases. For there is a unifying and edifying
principle undergirding these judicial pronouncements: that values
which serve the purpose of maintaining a civilized social order
and/or democratic political system are constitutionally acceptable
under the Free Speech Clause (although they are not necessarily
the only constitutionally acceptable values under the Clause)"8
In Fraser and perhaps in Kuhlmeier this principle is arguably not
more ruminative dicta, but an integral part of the holdings and a
key element of the emergent standard for measuring the constitu-
tionality of values inculcation in the public schools. 9 At the very
278 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681, 683 (1986). Indeed, even prior to Kuhlmeier and
Fraser, the Court has frequently returned with enthusiasm to the theme that one of the
public schools' most crucial tasks is to inculcate values that will enable the continuation
of a civilized social order and/or democratic political system. Levin, supra note 49, at
1648; Nomi M. Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out".• Assimilation, Indoctrination,
and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 582, 642-45 (1993). See, e.g., Ed-
wards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987) (reciting that the public schools are the
symbol of democracy and "the most pervasive means" of perpetuating our common desti-
ny); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (explaining that "[slchools are places where we inculcate the values
essential to the meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing citi-
zenry"); Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
864 (1982) (asserting that public schooling inculcates the values essential to preserving a
democratic political system); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (stating that educa-
tion is "a most vital civic institution" for the preservation of democracy); Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77, 79 (1979) (reiterating that pubic schools inculcate values need-
ed to sustain democratic government); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 30 (1973); (referring to the vital role of education in a free society); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (opining that some degree of education is necessary to
prepare citizens to participate in an open political system so as to preserve "freedom and
independence"); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (remarking upon
"the importance of education to our democratic society"); West Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943) (noting that national unity is a goal which public
schools may nurture by persuasion and example).
279 This is an admittedly broad reading of the holdings in Fraser and Kuhlmeier. Nev-
ertheless, it is a reading that is analytically supportable. That this principle is part of the
holding in Fraser is evidenced by the Court's equation of the school's "basic educational
mission," which justifies curtailment of school-sponsored student speech, with teaching
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least, the principle may be treated as a favored precatory standard
to which the Court has repeatedly returned in deciding these
types of cases and to which it is likely to return in the future.a
By this standard, curricularly inculcated values, which serve the
goals of maintaining a civilized social order and- democratic politi-
cal system should survive a Free Speech Clause challenge because
such values are reasonably related to a "legitimate pedagogical
concern." Curricularly inculcated values which do not serve these
goals may or may not survive such a challenge in accordance with
ad hoc judicial assessments of the constitutionality of such values.
While this standard has the potential for progressively con-
tracting the troublesome grey area of whose values may be taught,
this is a measure of constitutionality that will necessarily engender
further perplexity. It still leaves unanswered the crucial question of
what other values, besides those named in the Court's opinions,
serve such broadly defined ends as civilized order and democra-
cy"' The continuing debate over that question is, in essence,
"the 'fundamental values' of public school education." Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-86. These
fundamental values, in turn, are described by the Court as those "'values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system'" and the "shared values of a civilized social
order." Id. at 683 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)). See Mitchell,
supra note 164, at 702; Rebeli, supra note 22, at 306-07. Arguably, the Court also relied
on this principle in reaching a holding in Kuhmeier. Kuhmeier, 484 U.S. 260. In
Kuhlmeier, the Court held "that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercis-
ing editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogi-
cIal concerns." Id. at 273. The Court found "legitimate pedagogical concerns" to encom-
pass, among other things, teaching of "'the shared values of a civilized social order.'" Id.
at 272. It was essentially because the school principal excised articles from the school-
sponsored newspaper in order to disassociate the school from values inconsistent with the
decorum, privacy and ethics of our social order that the Court rejected Kuhlmeier's Free
Speech Clause claim. Id. at 271-76. See Rebell, supra note 22, at 310.
280 See supra notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
281 There is no dearth of proposals in the scholarly literature as to how to identify
those values which public elementary and secondary schools may constitutionally inculcate
under the Free Speech Clause. E.g., George Z. Bereday, Values, Education and the Law, 48
Miss. LJ. 585, 609-15 (1977) (theorizing that schools have a duty to teach those values
imbedded in the law); Diamond, supra note 99, at 526-29 (positing that schools should
inculcate local community values); Freeman, supra note 115, at 42, 54-57 (listing domestic
laws as well as ethical views not contrary to legally based values as sources of values ap-
propriate for school inculcation); Gordon, supra note 54, at 549, 555-58 (suggesting that
public schools should teach values that will lead to better understanding of reality and
improvement of rational decisionmaking and recommending that a discursive method of
teaching should be used to convey nonconstitutional -values while a discursive or directive
method should be used to transmit constitutional values); Hafen, supra note 177, at 605-
07, 615-16 (proposing that schools should teach universal values such as honesty, toler-
ance, civic loyalty, personal responsibility, plus First Amendment values); Ingber, supra
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the jurisprudential counterpart in the post-Kuhlmeier era to the
pedagogical conflict over morals education.
2 82
note 10, at 67-71 (contending that schools should derive values for inculcative purposes
from the "community agenda of alternatives" consistent with the dominant culture and
from those rational values enunciated by the federal courts); Levin, supra note 49, at
1654 (stating that schools should teach the values inherent in a democratic, participatory
society by observance of the same constitutional constraints placed on other governmental
agencies); Moskowitz, supra note 22, at 136 (arguing that schools may inculcate universal-
ly accepted values, such as justice, property rights, respect for law and authority, and
brotherhood, so as to preserve the modem state and democracy); Rebell, supra note 22,
at 289-91 (maintaining that the content of schools' values inculcation should be deter-
mined by "a broad participatory process" in the local school community); Stolzenberg,
supra note 278, at 666-67 (concluding that, regardless of their respective inadequacies, the
ideologies of liberal individualism, communitarianism, and civic republicanism will contin-
ue to influence the values which schools inculcate); Wright, supra note 10, at 65, 72-73
(opining that schools should inculcate values so as not to violate a "significant impair-
ment of relevant capacity" standard and so as to achieve "rights-exercise preparation").
282 No discussion of the post-Kuhlmeier era would be complete without some consider-
ation of Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) and R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota,
112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), free speech cases outside the education context but potentially
bearing upon it in relation to values inculcation.
The Rust litigation was brought, among other reasons, to test the constitutionality
under the Free Speech Clause of federal regulations prohibiting recipients of funds un-
der Tite X of the Public Health Service Act from discussing abortion as an option with
patients. Rust, 500 U.S. at 192. Petitioners contended that tfie regulations constituted
viewpoint-discriminatory conditions on the Title X subsidies in violation of the First
Amendment. Id. In ruling for respondents, the Supreme Court held that the federal
government is constitutionally empowered to fund selectively a program encouraging
certain activities in the public interest, while not encouraging other activities, and to
curtail fund recipients' speech so that it does not go beyond implementation of the
encouraged activities. Id. at 192-200. The Rust Court limited the holding, however, with
the caveat that the mere fact that expression occurs on government property does not
justify government viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions of speech in public or semi-public
fora or in universities-a "traditional sphere of free expression." Id. at 199-200. Interest-
ingly, the Court did not exempt public schooling at the elementary and secondary levels
from the reach of Rust's holding. A reasonable implication of this omission is that since
public elementary and secondary schools receive federal funding, the federal government
may condition its grants on content-based regulation of the messages purveyed by the
schools. Cf. Michael Fitzpatrick, Note, Rust Corrodes: The First Amendment Implications of Rust
v. Sullivan, 45 STAN. L. REV. 185, 200-01 (1992) (inquiring "how far can Rust spread" in
light of the fact that federal monies help support education); Karen Hilmoe, Note, Rust
v. Sullivan: Free Speech Is "Signflantly Impinged" by Title X Regulations, 37 S.D. L. REV. 600,
619 (1992) (hypothesizing that if Rust had preceded the Barnette case, the
schoolchildren's free speech claims in Barnette would not have prevailed); Ann B. Weeks,
Note, The Pregnant Silence: Rust v. Sullivan, Abortion Rights, and Publicly Funded Speech, 70
N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1667 (1992) (expressing concern 'that federal grants to the arts and
libraries "are but two" of the federal subsidies that could trigger Rust's "loosened stan-
dards for analysis of governmental restrictions on subsidized speech"). The implication is
a sound one based on the U.S. Supreme Court's repeated recognition of the uniquely
inculcative role of the public elementary and secondary schools. See supra text accompany-
ing note 278; David Cole, Biyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in
Government - Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 706, 728-30, 738 (1992) (observing that
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In sum, the Court, like the psychologists and educators, has
concluded that values inculcation is an integral part of effective
schooling at the elementary and secondary levels. The Court also
has concluded that some values inculcation by the public schools
is permissible under the Free Speech Clause.2s3 The latter con-
a mandate of strict neutrality in government-subsidized speech is not only rejected by
Rust but also incompatible with the responsibilities of public elementary and secondary
schools). Thus, Rust's impact, if any, on public elementary and secondary education
would be to lend further support to the constitutionality, under the Free Speech Clause,
of the schools' inculcative work.
The RA.V. case arose out of charges brought against petitioner, a teenager, who, in
concert with several other youths, burned a cross in the yard of an African-American
family residing in the city of St. Paul. Petitioner was charged under the city's criminal
ordinance prohibiting expression which "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541 (quoting
the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn., MINN. LEGIS. CODE §292.02
(1990)). The Supreme Court, assuming arguendo that the cross burning was constitution-
ally unprotected "fighting words," held that the ordinance still violated the Free Speech
Clause because the law proscribed a subset of "fighting words" singled out for its underly-
ing message. 112 S. Ct. at 2542-49.
In the aftermath of RA.V., questions have been raised about whether the Free
Speech Clause permits public colleges and universities to promulgate "hate speech" codes
analogous to the St. Paul ordinance. See, e.g., Lauri A. Ebel, University Anti-Discrimination
Codes v. Free Speech, 23 N.M. L. REv. 169 (1993); Daniel A. Farber; Foreword: Hate Speech
After R.A.V., 18 WM. MITCHELL L REV. 889 (1992); Rhonda G. Hartman, Hateful Expression
and First Amendment Values: Toward a Theory of Constitutional Constraint on Hate Speech at
Colleges and Universities After R.A.V. v. St. Pau 19 J.C. & U.L. 343 (1993); William A.
Kaplin, "Hate Speech" on the College Campus: Freedom of Speech and Equality at the Crossroads,
27 LAND & WATER L. REv. 243 (1992). In contrast, it is doubtful that R.A.V has any
potential to interfere with values inculcation in the public elementary and secondary
schools. See Ebel, supra, at 171, 177; Fischer, supra note 197, at 379-81. RA.V., after all,
involved a criminal ordinance applicable to "hate speech" city-wide. Values inculcation in
public elementary and secondary schools is carried out only in relation to minors and is
an accepted, traditional function of those schools. See supra text accompanying note 278;
Fischer, supra note 197, at 380. Indeed, fifty years of precedents recognizing the constitu-
tionality of values inculcation in the schools would be overturned were R.A.V to be ex-
tended to precollege public education. See supra text accompanying notes 116-283. It is
unlikely that in rendering RA.V., the Court looked ahead to any such wholesale revamp-
ing of American education.
283 For commentary in accord with the Supreme Court's position that some teaching
of preferred values is constitutional under the Free Speech Clause, see, for example
YUDOF, supra note 165, at 53-54; Diamond, supra note 99, at 498, 526-28; Freeman, supra
note 115 at 24; Hafen, supra note 177, at 605-07, 615; Levin, supra note 49, at 1648,
1653-54; Mitchell, supia note 164, at 692; Moskowitz, supra note 22, at 133-36; Rebell,
supra note 22, at 298, 338-42; Stewart, supra note 170, at 25-29; Wright, supra note 10, at
68, 73. However, some legal scholars advance the notion that any values inculcation is
indoctrination incompatible with free speech principles. E.g., ARONS, supra note 177, at
189-213; Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause
67 CAL. L. REV. 1104, 1134-35 (1979); van Geel, supra note 15, at 239, 253, 261, 289-91;
see Roe, supra note 101, at 1330-35.
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clusion is most fortunate since it places constitutional law in the
position of furthering rather than undermining Free Speech
Clause objectives and the public schools' mission. It is less fortu-
nate, however, that some eighty years after deciding Meyer v. Ne-
braska, the Court's conclusions still fall short of fully resolving the
jurisprudential dilemma. The formidable task remains of distin-
guishing those values which may be constitutionally inculcated
through the curriculum because they are reasonably related to the
"legitimate pedagogical concern" of preparing the nation's chil-
dren to carry on a civilized social order and democratic political
system.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE PEDAGOGICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA: REASONED INCULCATION OF
IDEATIONAL PREREQUISITES
The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Fraser and Kuhlmeier, if
not a clarion call to action, are at least authoritative reassurance
that the nation's public elementary and secondary schools may,
and indeed are expected to, take full advantage of a considerable
latitude for inculcation afforded them under the Free Speech
Clause. Yet, latitude so broadly and imprecisely bestowed-allowing
the schools to teach values supportive of a democratic political
system and civilized social order-is still perilous terrain for educa-
tors to traverse without running the risk of inadvertently overstep-
ping constitutional bounds."4 We are a populace that has, as a
legal and philosophical matter, agreed to tolerate disagreement.
Diversity of opinion and belief is a veritable hallmark of the Amer-
ican way of life as well as a phenomenon traditionally protected by
free speech principles in society at large." It would be prepos-
terous to assume that there exists any one value of which all 261
million Americans2sM unanimously approve.2 7 The issue which
emerges from Fraser and Kuhlmeier, considered in light of these
284 See Ann M. Gill, In the Wake of Fraser and Hazelwood, 20 J.L. & EDUC. 253, 257-58
(1991).
285 Board of Educ., Island Trees. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
880 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREsSION 4-5, 14-15 (1970); Charles
R. Kesler, Education and Politics: Lessons from the American Founding, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
101, 117.
286 In 1990, the population of the United States was 248,709,873 people and was pro-
jected to grow at a rate of approximately 3,000,000 people per year. THE WORLD ALMA-
NAC AND BOOK OF FAcTs 1994 358-62 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1993).
287 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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societal realities, is how to identify the core values which the
schools may inculcate, despite individuals' varying subjective pref-
erences, because those values objectively serve the causes of civili-
zation and democracy. Fraser and Kuhlmeier, in effect, presuppose
that there are such values and that they transcend the free speech
claims of dissenters.s
The Supreme Court's tacit acceptance of this presupposition
may best be conceptualized and justified by analogy to internation-
al human rights law. By recognizing the existence of such a core
of transcending values, the Court has created a sort of domestic
jus cogens for American public schools. Jus cogens is an internation-
al law doctrine which is commonly translated into English to mean
peremptory norms, i.e., a body of norms or values that are abso-
lute, paramount, and nonderogable. 9  The content of jus
cogens-the particular norms which qualify for this transcending
status-is constantly- evolving as the interests of the international
community change.290 One expert has summarized jus cogens as
288 Cf Dienes & Connolly, supra note 115, at 345 (noting that Kuhimeler makes re-
straint of dissenting student speech occurring in a curricular context virtually immune
from judicial scrutiny); Fischer, supra note 197, at 386 (remarking that Kuhmeier accords
to students only those free speech rights that the school administration will allow);
Hafen, supra note 252, at 701 (interpreting Kuhlneier as upholding under the Free
Speech Clause the schools' institutional authority to inculcate values unimpeded); Hafen,
supra note 177, at 614-18 (theorizing that Kuhlmeier reads into the Free Speech Clause
institutional academic freedom to inculcate values); Rebell, supra note 22, at 309 (assert-
ing that, after Kuhlmeier, students' expression of divergent views will only receive signif-
icant Free Speech Clause protection if the expression takes place outside of the curricu-
lum); Roe, supra note 101, at 1285, 1287-88 (asserting that the Fraser Court exhibited a
willingness to defer to the schools' inculcative agenda and uphold under the Free Speech
Clause school regulations of student speech countering that agenda).
289 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in force Jan. 27, 1980, art. 53,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 334 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; IAN BROWNUE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBJIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 512-15 (4th ed. 1990); MYRES S. MCDouGAL ET AL, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 342-45 (1980); Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment:
The Domestic Effects of International Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U.
CIN. L. REv. 655, 677 n.80 (1983); Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power:. Conflicts
Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1138-42 (1985); Karen
Parker & Lyn B. Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L REv. 411, 415 (1989); Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens
in International Law, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 55, 58 (1966); Christopher P. Cline, Note, Pursu-
ing Native American Rights in International Law Venues: A Jus Cogens Strategy After Lying v.
Northwest Indian Cemeteiy Protective Association, 42 HASTINGS LJ. 591, 593, 598-99 (1991).
But see ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 178-79 (1986) (con-
tending that, at least theoretically, there are circumstances that would permit a nation to
override jus cogens).
290 Gordon A. Christenson, The World Court and Jus Cogens, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 93, 97-
98 (1987); Parker & Neylon, supra note 289, at 427-29; Marjorie M. Whiteman, Jus Cogens
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"those rules which [are] derived from principles that the legal
conscience of mankind deem[s] absolutely essential to coexis-
tence." 9' Over time, international law scholars have compiled
lists of enduring jus cogens norms including the prohibition of slav-
ery, genocide, piracy, crimes against humanity, etc. 292 The analo-
gy of jus cogens to the Fraser/Kuhlmeier concept of a core of tran-
scending values is thus almost perfect, not in the sense of a norm
for norm concordance, but in the basic idea that nonderogable
values can and do exist by law and by law reign virtually supreme
in the face of objection and recalcitrance. This is not to imply
that the Justices intentionally looked to jus cogens in rendering
Fraser and Kuhlmeier. But, such a coincidence is most fitting in that
values supportive of the democratic and civilized conduct of a
nation's affairs would also seem to be values that, in some degree,
spring from a concern for human rights."
The prospect of identifying a core of such transcending values
that public schools may constitutionally inculcate has tantalized a
number of legal scholars. The resulting proposals have displayed a
varied inventiveness, including recommendations that schools
should inculcate local community values, 4 values that attune the
child to reality,29 universal values,29 and values that enhance
in International Law, with a Projected List, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 609, 625 (1977).
291 U N. Conf. on the Law of Treaties, U. N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 52d mtg. at 294, U.N.
(Doc.) A/Conf. 39/11, U.N. Sales No. E68.V.7 (1969) (statement of Mr. Suarez, Mexican
delegate to the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties).
292 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702 (1987); BROWNLIE, supra note 289, at 513; McDoUGAL ET AL., supra note 289, at
345-50; Parker & Neylon, supra note 289, at 428-43.
293 Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AM. J. INT'L
L 851, 852-60 (1989); Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurispru-
dentially Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 How. L.J. 145, 210-22 (1984); Vaclav
Havel, The New Measure of Man, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1994, at A27. See Gordon A.
Christenson, Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal Protection Analyses, 52
U. CIN. L. REv. 3, 12, 36-37 (1983); Justice Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and
the Law of Nations: Owing a Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, Address at
the 1994 Annual Meeting of American Society of International Law (April, 1994), in ASIL
NEWSLETTER, March-May 1994, at 1, 7-9.
294 E.g., Diamond, supra note 99, at 526-29; Ingber, supra note 10, at 64-71; Stewart,
supra note 170, at 27-28; see Rebell, supra note 22, at 289-91; Shiffrin, supra note 15, at
651-53.
295 E.g., Gordon, supra note 54, at 549, 555-58.
296 Professor Bruce Hafen urges inculcation in "universal values that all citizens must
understand and accept as conditions of social survival in a free society, such as honesty,
tolerance, civic loyalty, and some degree of personal responsibility." Hafen, supra note
177, at 606-607, 615-16. See also Moskowitz, supra note 22, at 136 (suggesting that there
are universally acceptable values appropriate for inculcation including justice, property
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rationality and decision-making capabilities.97 One writer, with
apparent resignation, has noted that no matter what the experts
wish, dominant ideologies of liberal individualism,
communitarianism, and civic republicanism will continue to influ-
ence which values the schools inculcate." s A review of the litera-
ture on the subject discloses that probably the most pervasively
held view is that a core of transcending values may be found in
the U.S. Constitution, state constitutions and/or other domestic
laws.' The wisdom of this recommendation is obvious inasmuch
as the federal Constitution and many other American laws are
predicated upon democratic tenets or aspirations for a civilizing
social structure or both."t Indeed, perusal of a few of the more
popularly known provisions of the U.S. Constitution evince the
generally humanizing thrust that American law has had over time
in spite of episodic lapses."'
rights, respect for authority, and brotherhood).
297 E.g., Gordon, supra note 54, at 549, 555-58; see Wright, supra note 10, at 65, 72-
73.
298 Stolzenberg, supra note 278, at 666-67.
299 E.g., Bereday, supra note 281, at 609-15; Freeman, supra note 115, at 42, 54-57;
Hafen, supra note 177, at 615; Wright, supra note 10, at 65, 67, 72-73; see David L. Greg-
ory, Teaching Moral Values in Public Schools, 31 CATH. LAW. 173, 174-75 (1987); Ingber, su-
p-a note 10, at 64-71; Kesler, supra note 22, at 113, 121-22; Levin, supra note 49, at 1654;
Shiffrin, sup-a note 15, at 652; cf. Oldenquist, sup-a note 112, at 86 (remarking that it
would be preposterous if public schools could not teach the values implicit in the
nation's criminal codes); Senhauser, supra note 115, at 979-80 (acknowledging that public
schools may encourage "an awareness of justice-principles of liberty, equality and red-
procity").
300 It is beyond cavil that the Constitution has made a major contribution toward the
realization of political democracy. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 32-33 (1991); WAL-
TER BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUsLY 136-44 (1987). But see ARTHUR S. MILL-
ER, DEMOCRATIC DIcrATORSHIP 111-22 (1981) (arguing that democracy in the United
States is something of a sham and is increasingly taking on the attributes of totalitarian-
ism); JUDITH N. SHKLAa, AMERiCAN CITIZENSHIP 1-23 (1991) (contending that "Ameri-
ca ... has in principle always been democratic, but only in principle," inasmuch as
slavery and disparities in earning power have undercut the implementation of such princi-
ples). Likewise, the U.S. Constitution is thought to have had a civilizing effect. See infra
notes 302-09, 334-35 and accompanying text.
301 Perhaps one of the most egregious lapses occurred when the Supreme Court
decided, in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), to recognize a substan-
tive due process "right" to slavery. Dred Scott was, of course, effectively overturned. See e.g.,
U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIII, § I' (prohibiting slavery); Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (guaranteeing
that states shall not deny any person equal protection of the laws); Id. amend. XV, § 1
(protecting against denial of the right to vote on account of race or previous servitude);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racially segregated public
schooling violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305-08 (1880) (denouncing racial subjugation as counter to
equal protection principles). Yet, no amount of repudiation can alter the fact that Dred
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The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause is
directly on point. On its face the clause's injunction that no state
may "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws,""° bespeaks a commitment to the dignity and
relative empowerment of each person in relation to every other
person."3 Historically, the Equal Protection Clause has been a
significant impetus to democracy and fairness by providing a vehi-
cle for promoting more equalized opportunities to participate in
the political and economic life of the country.304 The Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause likewise reveals in its promise
that no "State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law,"3 5 a bulwark against govern-
mental arbitrariness36 as the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel
and unusual punishments" °7  erects barriers to barbarism.3 8
Scott was rendered, leaving an indelible stain upon the nation's history. Other infamous
moments in American legal history include Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (upholding congressionally authorized detention and relocation of persons of Japa-
nese ancestry in the western United States during World War II); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896) (ruling that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause does
not prohibit racially segregated train accommodations); and Congress' enactment of the
Sedition Act of 1798 which, among other things, provided for the criminal liability of
persons who engaged in expression inspiring hatred against certain federal governmental
officials or exciting movements in opposition to federal laws. Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Star.
596, at § 2. The Sedition Act has been characterized as "one of the most blatant viola-
tions of the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech that ever became law." MILLER,
supra note 108, at 53. Accord BERNS, supra note 301, at 144.
302 U.S. CONST. amend. XWV, § 1.
303 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1982); TRIBE, supra note 14, § 16-1, at 1437-
38.
304 The classic case in which the Equal Protection Clause was relied upon to enable
enhanced and more equalized opportunities for the nation's minorities in comparison to
the Caucasian majority is Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In holding that
so-called separate but equal public schooling for black children violates the clause, the
court observed that without equal educational opportunities "it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life." Id. at 493. Indeed, Martin Luther King,
Jr. has credited the Brown decision as an impetus to the civil rights movement that fol-
lowed on the heels of the decision. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREE-
DOM 195, 198-99 (1958). Other cases interpreting the Equal Protection Clause to the
same general purpose include Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), striking down Texas'
ban on the free public education of illegal alien children, and Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948), prohibiting state courts from granting injunctions to plaintiffs seeking to
enforce privately negotiated racially restrictive covenants.
305 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
306 TRIBE, supra note 14, § 10-7, at 663-64.
307 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
308 For example, in Hudson v. McMillan, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992), the Court held that
use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute a violation of the Eighth
Amendment even though the prisoner is not seriously injured. In her opinion for the
Court, Justice O'Connor describes the Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punish-
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Since these and other provisions of the U.S. Constitution set stan-
dards which less paramount laws may not legally contravene,' it
is not surprising that commentators have looked to domestic law
as a rich source of values appropriate for inculcation by the public
schools. These are values that, once learned, should enable chil-
dren to appreciate the importance- of a civilized social order and
democratic political system.
Were Fraser and Kuhlmeier decided during the early republic
or even during the first half of the twentieth century, relying upon
American law as the main repository of values content for school-
children would probably be a satisfyingly complete answer to the
question of whose values should be taught, especially if law-related
values were supplemented by traditional homilies about courage,
honesty and other republican virtues."'0 The fact is, though, that
Frasers and Kuhlmeiers formula for locating values suitable for
constitutional inculcation may make exclusive reliance on domestic
law or other domestic sources of values an inadequate, if not an-
tique, notion in this era.
It is trite but no less true to say that the world has become a
global village."' The development of sophisticated, new means of
communicating and doing business means that Americans are
called upon to interact on the international scene more immedi-
ately and more frequently than ever before. 12 Increasingly, the
ment as drawing its meaning from evolving or contemporary standards of decency. 112 S.
Ct. at 1000. Accord Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2482 (1993). Even more recent-
ly, the Court has referred to the Eighth Amendment as forbidding the denial of "hu-
mane conditions of confinement." Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1984 (1994).
309 The Supremacy Clause instructs that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the Unit-
ed States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof" are the "supreme Law of the Land"
such that the "Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitu-
tion or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
This provision has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to signify that state laws
which contravene the federal Constitution are invalid. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954). The Court is empowered and obligated, in the cases and, controversies
that come before it, also to invalidate federal legislation that flouts the U.S. Constitution.
E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
310 See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
311 Saul Mendlovitz, Introduction to RICHARD A. FALIK, A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS
xxvi (1975); Pico Iyer, The Global Village Finally Arrives, TIME, Fall 1993, at 86; Lance Mor-
row, Welcome to the Global Village, TIME, May 29, 1989, at 96.
312 Andrew Kupfer, Managing Now for the 1990s, FORTUNE, Sept. 26, 1988, at 44; Dan-
iel J. Meckstroth, Reengineering U.S. Manufacturing. Implications of Structural Changes in the
U.S. Economy, Bus. ECON., July, 1994, at 43; James H. Potter, Survival of the Leaders, FIN.
WORLD, July 28, 1987, at 37; Martin M. Wooster, As the One World Turns, REASON, June,
1994, at 55. See also Christenson, supra note 293, at 6 (observing that "global telecommu-
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United States has found itself operating in an inextricable web of
economic and political interdependence with other nationsY
Contemporary events manifest that American economic, political,
and national security interests arise in every corner of the globe.
For example, this country's 1991 war against Iraq, as well as Amer-
ican involvement in overseeing the peace process between Israel
and various Arab states, demonstrate the view of U.S. political
leaders that stability in the Middle East is integral to the economic
and security interests of the United States. 14 Similarly, the devel-
oping nuclear weapons capability of North Korea and unrelenting
fighting in former Yugoslavia have prompted energetic American
diplomatic efforts since both developments, although half a world
away, are potential threats to international peace. 15 Even tyranny
in little Haiti has ramifications internal to the United States and
to relations among the nations of the western hemisphere." 6 In
nications make us aware of global interdependence with respect to almost every aspect of
our daily lives").
313 RICHARD A. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET: PROJECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR HU-
MAN SURViVAL 98 (1971); Christenson, supra note 293, at 6; Cline, supra note 289, at 591;
Kenneth L Woodward, More Than Ourselves, NEWSWEEK, July 18, 1994, at 66.
314 One reason for the United States' war against Iraq was economic, i.e., to prevent
disruption of the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf and the domestic recessionary effects
that could result. Walter Isaacson, Sometimes, Right Makes Might, TIME, Dec. 21, 1992, at
82; Matthew L. Wald, The Ground War and the American Economy: Further Drop Seen in the
Price of Oil N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1991, at DI. Another reason prompting the war was
American political revulsion at Saddam Hussein's dictatorship. Patrick, E. Tyler, War in the
Gu/f" The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1991, at Al. But see Isaacson, supra, at 82
(suggesting that American objections to Saddam Hussein's rule on moral grounds were
superficial). Although the Persian Gulf War is one of the more dramatic instances of the
United States defending its interests in the Middle East, recent years have seen a flurry
of American diplomatic activities aimed at achieving peaceful relations between Israelis
and Arabs. Steven Greenhouse, Christopher Sees Progress, Not Breakthrough, in Syria, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1994, at A4; J.F.O. McAllister, Bridging the Divide, TIME, July 25, 1994, at
37.
315 The United States has been engaged in continuing direct negotiations with North
Korea over the latter's compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and other
related matters. J.F.O. McAllister, Pyongyang's Dangerous Game, TIME, Apr. 4, 1994, at 60.
The United States has also been a key player in pressuring the warring factions in for-
mer Yugoslavia to agree to peace. Alan Riding, Western Nations to Add Sanctions After Serbs
Balk, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1994, at Al.
316 President Clinton has stated that the American stake in Haiti includes "Americans
living and working there .... a million Haitian-Americans in this country who have fami-
ly and friends there . . .. an interest in promoting democracy in our hemisphere, ...
[and] a strong and democratic Latin America and Central America and Caribbean with
which to trade and grow." Excerpts from President Clinton's News Conference at White House,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1994, at A1O. It might be added that American interests also include
stemming the influx of Haitian refugees into the United States. Kevin Fedarko, Policy at
Sea, TIME, July 18, 1994, at 20.
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short, the shrinking globe has made the United States acutely
sensitive to a geopolitical butterfly effect---that disturbances in
distant places, no matter how small, may well have unpredictable
and serious reverberations at home.
Moreover, the very nature of American interests and how they
are implemented is undergoing transformation. The most salient
example is that of the United States' armed forces being deployed
with mounting frequency in other countries primarily, if not exclu-
sively, for humanitarian purposes. In recent years, the United
States has intervened militarily in Somalia and Rwanda, not to
rout an ideological enemy or influence political developments in
those nations, but to alleviate human suffering occurring on a
catastrophic scale. 18
In the meantime, this century has seen a momentous prolifer-
ation of major human rights declarations and treaties protecting
individuals' rights.319 The United States is a party to some of
these treaties;310 other treaty provisions and nontreaty human
317 The concept of the butterfly effect originated in the work of meteorologist Ed-
ward Lorenz and contributed to the development of chaos theory in the physical scienc-
es. JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS 11-31 (1987).
318 Lam M. Baidoa, Somalia: The Gift of Hope TIME, Dec. 28, 1992, at 20; Nancy
Gibbs, Rwanda: Destination Unknown, TIME, Aug. 8, 1994, at 38; Nancy Gibbs, Rwanda: Cry
the Forsaken Country, TIME, Aug. 1, 1994, at 30; Charles Krauthammer, The Immaculate Inter-
vention, TIME, July 26, 1993, at 78; Jill Smolowe, Great Expectations, TIME, Dec. 21, 1992, at
32. The military's growing involvement in humanitarian missions has caused some conster-
nation about the United States' preparedness to conduct war. Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Wor-
ries About Cost of Aid Missions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1994, at A4; Eric Schmitt, Militaris
Growing Role in Relief Missions Prompts Concerns; N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1994, at A3.
319 Although international human rights law can be traced back for centuries, its
modem incarnation took place during the 1940's in reaction to Nazi atrocities. Louis B.
Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32
AM. U. L. REV. 1, 11 (1982); Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 405, 407-08 (1979); Cline, supra note 289, at 597-98.
320 E.g., U.N. CHARTER; Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization
of American States, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607 (entered into force for the United
States, Feb. 27, 1970) [hereinafter Protocol of Buenos Aires]; Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force
Oct. 4, 1967); Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade,
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Apr. 30, 1957); Protocol to the Slavery Convention, De-
cember 7, 1953, 7 U.S.T. 479, 182 U.N.T.S. 51 & 212 U.N.T.S. 17 (entered into force
Dec. 7, 1953); Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for signature Mar. 31,
1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force July 7, 1954); Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
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rights instruments have come to bind the United States as custom-
ary international law. 2' Many of the human rights covenants to
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9,
1948, S. EXEc. DOc. No. 0, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) [hereinafter Genocide Conven-
tion]; Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights of Women, May 2,
1948, 27 U.S.T. 3301, O.A.S.T.S. No. 3 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1949); The Charter
of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 48
(entered into force for the United States, Dec. 13, 1951); The Slavery Convention, Sept.
25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, as amended July 7, 1955, 7 U.S.T. 479, 182
U.N.T.S. 51 (entered into force Mar. 9, 1927). One commentator has observed that, in
actuality, "the United States has ratified only a handful" of the major international hu-
man rights instruments in existence. Lillich, supra note 293, at 855. Accord Nadine
Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative
Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 810-11 (1990). What is
more, the lower federal courts tend to hold that the human rights provisions of ratified
treaties are non-self-executing and therefore "not the source of enforceable rights."
Lillich, supra note 293, at 855 & n.19; Strossen, supra, at 813.
However, the United States may also have some legal obligations in relation to
international human rights instruments that it has signed but not yet ratified. Article 18
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that, "[a] State is obliged to
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has
signed the treaty . . . or (b) expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty." Vienna
Convention, supra note 289, at art. 18; Strossen, supra, at 810, n.19. The United States
has signed but not ratified either the Vienna Convention or a number of international
human rights agreements. E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter Civil and Political Rights Covenant]; International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered
into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter Economic, Etc. Rights Covenant]; International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660
U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter Elimination of Racial Discrim-
ination Convention]; Strossen, supra, at 810 nn.19-20.
321 Sources of customary international law include "general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation" and international agreements
"when such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact
widely accepted." 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES §§ 102(1)-(3) (1987). Thus, nontreaty instruments, and even treaties to which
this country is not a party may, under certain circumstances, constitute customary interna-
tional law. MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 289, at 266-71. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, a United Nations General Assembly resolution and non-treaty instrument,
is widely accepted as customary international law. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 43
AM. J. INT'L L. 127 (Supp. 1949) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; McDOUGAL ET AL.,
supra note 289, at 272; Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in
Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 367, 393-95 (1985). Economic, Etc., Rights Covenant,
supra note 320, and Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 320, are two long-
standing human rights covenants which the United States has not yet ratified, but which
are regarded by eminent international law scholars as having attained the status of cus-
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which the United States is not a party or which have not attained
the status of customary international law are of such prestige and
influence as to shape opinion spontaneously, without the sanction
of law. 22 The point is that just as technological developments in
communications, in the means of doing business and in the con-
duct of warfare have made isolationism impossible, the develop-
ment of international human rights law and the international
opinion actuated thereby have become phenomena with which the
United States cannot fail to reckon.
Under these conditions, the question naturally arises as to
whether the democratic political system and civilized social order
* that children are expected to someday preserve can be understood
only in terms of the values embedded in American laws. Perhaps
the time has come to acknowledge that, although American law
values, republican virtues, and the like should continue to figure
as part of the schools' inculcative fare, the concepts of democracy
and of a civilized social order have larger dimensions than these
tomary international law. McDOUGAL Er AL., supra note 289, at 327. It should be noted
that customary international law is treated as binding federal common law. The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Lillich, supra note 293, at 856-57; Lillich, supra, at
393; Parker & Neylon, supra note 289, at 417. But see Lobel, supra note 289, at 1072
(pointing out that although customary international law is, as a theoretical matter, the
law of the land, domestic courts have held that Congress has authority to disregard such
law). The following human rights are generally accepted, as of 1987, as part of customary
international law: freedom from genocide; from slavery or the slave trade; from murder
or causing the disappearance of individuals; from torture or other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment; from prolonged arbitrary detention; from systematic
racial discrimination; and from a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights. 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987).
322 The inherent pedagogical effect of laws in general upon the populace has been
recognized for centuries. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
952, 1105 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941); Plato, Laws VII, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF
PLATO, INCLUDING THE LETTERS 1418-19, 1502 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds.,
1969) (A.E. Taylor trans. 1934); Anne Norton, Transubstantiation: The Dialectic of Constitu-
tional Authority, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 458, 459, 469 (1988); Philip Soper, The Moral Value of
Law, 84 MICH. L. REv. 63, 85 (1985). International law plays this role as well. ELLIOTr L.
MEYROwrrz, PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
xvi (1990). See FRANCIS A. BOYLE, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 417-19 (1989). A recent instance of this dynamic may be observed in
connection with the U. N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28
I.L.M. 1448 (1989) [hereinafter Convention of the Child]. See Cynthia P. Cohen &
Howard A. Davidson, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA iv (Cynthia P. Cohen & Howard A.
Davidson eds., 1990). On an anecdotal note, this author can report that the Convention
on the Rights of the Child has inspired and served as a guide for a grassroots effort in
Michigan to amend the state constitution so as to add positive rights exclusively for chil-
dren.
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values presently encompass.23 This realization should cause no
surprise. It seems inevitable that an expanding frame of reference
would be the conceptual by-product of global village dynamics -
dynamics that respect no borders and that have the potential to
profoundly damage further political and social progress in the
United States.
For example, in an age when weapons of mass destruction
may instantly wipe out entire cities and make life on earth impos-
sible, war becomes a threat not merely to a democratic political
system and civilized social order, but to the very continuation of
the human race. 24 This threat emanates from the possibility of
another world war, as well as from regional armed conflicts which
may expand beyond the initial theatres of war.' Such circum-
stances create the need for public elementary and secondary
schools to inculcate children with those values that are likely to be
instrumental in preventing or restraining war-values such as a
preference for peace; a tolerance of other peoples and other cul-
tures; an abhorrence of genocide and of other forms of invidious
discrimination; and acceptance of the rule of law and of the Unit-
ed Nations as mechanisms for maintaining international order. 26
323 See infra notes 324-61 and accompanying text.
324 Patricia J. Lindop & J. Rotblat, Consequences of Radioactive Fallout, in THE FINAL
EPIDEMIC 117, 149-50 (Ruth Adams & Susan Cullens eds., 1981); JONATHAN SCHELL, THE
FATE OF THE EARTH 93-96 (1982); MARTIN VAN CREVELD, TECHNOLOGY AND WAR 257
(1989).
325 GEOFFREY BLAINEY, THE CAUSES OF WAR 228-42 (3d ed. 1988).
326 Obviously, people educated to cherish peaceful coexistence and to abhor genocide
will be inclined to shun armed conflict. The connection between peace and values such
as tolerance of others is perhaps not as direct, but it is a connection that is just as real.
Indeed, the connection has become all too vivid in a decade that has witnessed merciless
tribal warfare in Rwanda and savage battles in the Balkans among ethnic and religious
groups. See supra note 318. Nor is the present decade an anomaly. This century has wit-
nessed Iraqis killing Kurds in Iraq, tall northern Sudanese massacring stocky southern
Sudanese, Pakistanis murdering Bengalis en masse in Bangladesh, Chinese executing Ti-
betans, and so on. ISRAEL W. CHARNY, How CAN WE COMMIT THE UNTHINKABLE? GENO-
CIDE 3 (1982). Of course, World War II, which convulsed the entire world, was stoked by
intolerance, i.e., by German anti-Semitism. DAVID S. WYMAN, THE ABANDONMENT OF THE
JEWS 1941-45, 3-5 (1984). It is true that rules of law and institutions dedicated to pre-
serving world peace, such as the United Nations, have failed to put an end to the car-
nage. RICHARD A. FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAw 85, 96-97 (1989); JULIUS STONE,
VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER 37, 40 (1984). However, it is impossible to calculate whether
the incidence of warfare would have been greater without these laws and organizations in
place. Respected international law scholars have, in fact, identified significant contribu-
tions of international legal regimes in mediating and defusing strife among nations.
BOYLE, supra note 322, at 16-18, 31-33, 74-75; William J. Bruce, The United States and the
Law of Mankind: Some Inconsistencies in American Observance of the Rule of Law, in POWER
AND LAW: AMERICAN DILEMMA IN WORLD AFFAIRS 85, 108-09 (Charles A. Barker ed.,
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Warfare is not the only menace to human existence and its
-incumbent democratic and civilized social structures. The past
decade has 'witnessed environmental destruction of harrowing
magnitude. Depletion of the ozone layer and aggravation of the
greenhouse effect have damaged the atmosphere and, if allowed
to continue, could ultimately make the earth uninhabitable.32
The nuclear accident at Chernobyl, 28 the chemical explosion at
Bhopal," the Exxon Valdez oil spill," and the ongoing razing
of the rain forestss are ominous indications that the human
species has not yet become adept at conserving its only habi-
tat.32 If the inculcative ends appointed by the Court in Fraser
and Kuhlmeier are to be fulfilled, the public schools should also be
imbuing their students with the values of respect and concern for
the environment.
Still, it is not material existence alone which is a precondition
to maintaining a democratic political system and a civilized social
order. Material existence that leaves behind the brutish and em-
braces conscience, empathy and decency is the pulse of a genuine
democratic and civilized social order evolving in international
interdependence."' 3 This means that if the public schools are to
1971); Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, in IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECHVE 389, 389-94 (Richard A. Falk et al. eds.,
1985).
327 Michael D. Lemonick, The Ozone Vanishes, TIME, Feb. 17, 1992, at 60; Michael
Oppenheimer, Climate Catastrophe, the Rerun, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1991, at A25. See also
John H. Cushman, Jr., Clinton Wants to Strengthen Global Pact on Air Pollution, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 1994, at A10; Warren E. Leary, Satellite Finds Growing Threat to Ozone, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 1993, at B7.
328 Colin Norman & David Dickson, The Aftermath of Chernoby4 Sci., Sept. 12, 1986, at
1141; Charles Perrow, Risky Systems: The Habit of Courting Disaster, NATION, Oct. 11, 1986,
at 329; What Chernobyl Did, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 1991, at 19.
329 Philip Elmer-DeWitt, What Happened at Bhopal: Union Carbide Blames the Tragedy on
Mishaps and Oversights, TIME, Apr. 1, 1985, at 71; Perrow, supra note 328, at 329.
330 Janet Raloff, Valdmz Spill Leaves Lasting Oil Impacts, So. NEWS, Feb. 13, 1993, at
102.
331 Cline, supra note 289, at 591; Philip Shabecoff, U.N. Gets Rescue Plan for Tropical
Forests, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1985, at C9.
332 See FALK, supra note 313, at 9-11; Resources and Responsibilities in a World of States,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 519, 523-24 (Richard Falk et al.
eds., 1985).
333 Tamas Foldesi, The Right to Move and Its Achilles Hee4 The Right to Asylum, 8 CONN.
J. INT'L L 289, 307 (1993); Fernando R. Teson, International Abductions, Low-lntensiy Con-
flicts and State Sovereignty: A Moral Inquiry, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 551, 570 (1994).
See Louis Henkin, Constitutional Rights and Human Rights, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 593,
630-32 (1978); Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially
Based Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 HOW. Lj. 145, 201-12, 223 (1984).
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produce young adults capable of upholding enlightened social
edifices, the schools would be well advised to instill in children a
revulsion toward torture, genocide, slavery and other transgressions
betokening a hardened disregard of human suffering.
Just as oxygen, water, and food are the material prerequisites
to life, the types of values described above are ideational prereq-
uisites to mankind's collective survival, not as mere organisms, but,
rather, as beings evolved to the higher destiny of a common hu-
manity. It is the thesis of this Article that it is "ideational prerequi-
sites to mankind's collective survival and humanity" that constitute
the core of transcending values, the domestic equivalent of jus
cogens, without which the population cannot long sustain a true
democratic and civilized social order responsive to the exigencies
of the late twentieth century. That is not to say, of course, that
only ideational prerequisites are appropriate for inculcation by the
public schools. Other values may be critically important in mold-
ing citizens dedicated to upholding democracy and civilization or
to serving other constitutionally acceptable ends. But, ideational
prerequisites are nonderogable in that they are values that, being
generally above dissenters' claims, the schools may inculcate with-
out running a significant risk of impinging upon students' Free
Speech Clause rights.
It will be recalled that commentators have typically looked to
American laws as the repository of a core of transcending values
that may be constitutionally inculcated and that that repository has
been aptly selected as embodying certain traditional principles of
democracy and civilized order. In fact, there is considerable over-
lap between such principles and ideational prerequisites. The
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause comes to mind
because of its express repugnance to racial and other invidious
discrimination. 34 Of course, abhorrence of slavery is the essence
of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of that institution.35
Protectiveness toward the environment is manifest in myriad stat-
utes and court decisions."'
334 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See supra notes 15 & 305 and accompanying text.
335 The Thirteenth Amendment provides that, "Neither slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convict-
ed, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
336 E.g., National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-460j-5 (West
1992 & Supp. 1994); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387
(West 1986 & Supp. 1994); Organotin Antifouling Paint Control Act of 1988, 33 U.S.C.A.
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Indeed, with the enactment of the Improving America's
Schools Act of 1994,""' federal education law has effectively em-
braced some ideational prerequisites as officially sanctioned curric-
ular fare in the nation's elementary and secondary schools. This
statute, among other things, authorizes funding for curricula that
enhance student understanding of the values underlying the Unit-
ed States' system of government, of the rights and responsibilities
of citizenship, and of the role of law in American constitutional
democracy."' 8 The statute specifically includes under the last top-
ic curricula that foster respect for cultural diversity and dedicate
the student to nonviolent means of conflict resolution such as
arbitration, mediation, and the like."3 9
Clearly, many American law values are also ideational prereq-
uisites; however, the overlap is by no means complete or sufficient.
More than a few values referred to in the U.S. Constitution "have
far wider scope as declared in the international [human rights]
instruments."'." For example, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights outlaws torture and cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishments*" while the federal Constitution
only prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments." 42  Likewise,
many articles of the United Nations Charter provide measures for
maintaining international peace" while the preamble of the
Constitution merely notes that one of the overarching purposes
motivating establishment of the Constitution is to "insure domestic
Tranquility."3" Nor does the Improving America's Schools Act
necessarily fill the void since its authorization of funds for teach-
ing schoolchildren about nonviolent dispute resolution is not ex-
pressly linked to promoting a concern for peace in the interna-
§§ 2401-2410 (West Supp. 1994); Lake Ontario Protection Act of 1976, 33 U.S.C.A. §
4261 (West 1986); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q (West 1983 & Supp. 1994);
California Wildlife Protection Act of 1990, CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2780-2799.6 (West
Supp. 1995); Pesticide Control Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 286.551-581 (West 1979
& Supp. 1994); Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975); P.F.Z. Properties, Inc. v.
Train, 393 F. Supp. 1370 (D.D.C. 1975).
337 Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 6301-8962 (West Supp.
1995).
338 Id. § 8142 (b)(1)(A)-(C).
339 Id. § 8142(b)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii).
340 See Lillich, supra note 293, at 852; accord, Henkin, supra note 319, at 416-19.
341 Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 320, art. 7.
342 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
343 E.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1, art. 2, paras. 3-4, arts. 33-38, arts. 39-51.
344 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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tional arena. 5 Finally, other values simply do not exist in Ameri-
can laws (although they may accord with American sentiment or
policy) but are articulated specifically and unequivocally in interna-
tional law instruments."s Many international human rights doc-
uments, for instance, direct the pursuit of international cultural
and educational cooperation. 47 Neither Congress nor state legis-
latures have commonly given legal status to this type of coopera-
tion. In sum, in an increasingly interactive global network, certain
values that are relevant to maintaining and updating the American
political system and social order must be descried in international
human rights law. It is these laws that currently provide perhaps
the richest and most relevant source of norms with which to sup-
plement and build upon traditional American values.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide an enumera-
tion of all conceivable ideational prerequisites or their internation-
al law sources. However, the ideational prerequisites described in
the discussion above-a commitment to peaceful coexistence, envi-
ronmental conservation, the United Nations, the rule of law, and
tolerance toward other people; and an abhorrence of genocide,
invidious discrimination, torture and other inhuman punish-
ments'S--should serve as a good starting point for schools in
preparing their students to maintain democracy and civilized order
in the twenty-first century. For, as has been shown, these are val-
ues that are the conceptual precondition to our collective survival
and humanity.349 It is fortuitous that these values, appearing re-
peatedly in international human rights instruments,"s also have
345 Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, 20 U.S.CA § 8142(b) (1) (B) (ii) (West
Supp. 1995).
346 See Lillich, supra note 293, at 852; Henkin, supra note 319, at 417-19.
347 E.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 55(b); Economic, Etc. Rights Covenant, supra note 320,
art. 2, para. 1, art. 15, para. 4; Protocol of Buenos Aires, supra note 320, arts. 46, 49-50,
99-101.
348 See supra notes 324-33 and accompanying text.
349 See supra notes 324-33 and accompanying text.
350 E.g., U.N. Charter, art. 1, par. 1, art. 2, paras. 3-4, arts. 33-51 (setting forth a
commitment to peaceful coexistence); Id. passim (manifesting a commitment to the Unit-
ed Nations and an international legal regime); Convention of the Child, supra note 322,
art. 29, para. 1(b) (demonstrating respect for principles of the U.N. Charter); Convention
of the Child, supra note 322, art. 29, para. I (c)-(d) (embracing tolerance and under-
standing toward other people); Convention of the Child, supra note 322, art. 29, para.
1(e) (manifesting respect for the natural environment); Genocide Convention, supra note
320, arts. I-IV (showing abhorrence of genocide); Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR,
39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), draft reprinted in 23 I.L.M.
1027, with final changes in 24 I.L.M. 535 (entered into force June 26, 1987) (banning
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the enhanced legitimacy and prestige that world consensus neces-
sarily lends to them.
Lest the idea of public schools inculcating the nation's youth
with international law norms raise fears of undermining American
identity and allegiance, it should be remembered that the United
States has played a significant role in developing many internation-
al laws and that international laws have long affected domestic
policy.35 The most obvious example of this interplay is the feder-
al government's exercise of its constitutional treaty power.352 The
United States is also bound by customary international law, which
is considered to be federal common law.15' Thus, the United
States is legally obligated to uphold those ideational prerequisites
embedded in customary international law.
International law has the potential to affect the internal affairs
of the United States in more subtle ways as well. On occasion in-
ternational law has been used as a means of informing or infusing
open-ended or cryptic provisions of the federal Constitution." A
significant number of international law scholars have urged this
torture and other inhuman punishments); Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note
320, art. 2, para. 1, arts. 3-4 (evincing repugnance toward invidious discrimination); Civil
and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 320, art 4, para. 1 (expressing commitment to
the rule of law); Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 320, art. 7 (asserting the
unacceptability of torture and other inhuman punishments); Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination Convention, supra note 320, art. 2, para. l(e) (discouraging barriers among
people on the basis of race); Universal Declaration, supra note 321, art. 1 (encouraging a
spirit of brotherhood); Universal Declaration, supra note 321, arts. 1-2, 4, 7 (repudiating
invidious discrimination). Concern for the environment is apparent in other types of
international law instruments. E.g., THE LAW% OF THE SEA' OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE U.N.
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA WAqTH ANNEXES AND INDEX at 70-85, U.N. Sales No.
E.83.V.5 (1983) (containing provisions for the protection and preservation of the marine
environment).
351 The United States has played a substantial part in the development of interna-
tional human rights law. Henkin, supra note 319, at 415; Lillich, supra note 293, at 852-
55. Ironically, international human rights law has thus far impacted upon the United
States only on an occasional basis. Lillich, supra note 293, at 855-60. Cf Ralph G.
Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutoy Construction, 43
VAND. L. REv. 1103, 1110 (1990) (describing the principle that federal statutes should
not be interpreted to violate international law if any other viable construction is possi-
ble). But see Henkin, supra note 319, at 421 (arguing that "we have not accepted interna-
tional human rights for ourselves").
352 "He [the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur .... " U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
353 See supra note 321.
354 E.g., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d. 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981)
(referring to international law as an aide in defining due process).
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general informing role of international human rights instruments
vis-a-vis the Constitution." The informing role also received an
approving nod from the four concurring Supreme Court Justices
in Oyama v. California,"5 ' when they looked to the United Nations
Charter to define constitutional norms under the Fourteenth
Amendment.57 Indeed, some scholars are of the view that in-
ternational human rights instruments may serve to inform the
Constitution even though they are not part of customary interna-
tional law.5 ' Be that as it may, the acceptance of the informing
or infusing role of international human rights law by respected
quarters in the legal community should allay any apprehension
that inculcation with ideational prerequisites of international ori-
gin will subvert the next generation. After all, if such ideational
prerequisites are fit to develop the Constitution's meaning, they
are no less fit to develop schoolchildren's moral sense. This is
especially the case since ideational prerequisites, as they have been
conceived here, necessarily are values that comport with a demo-
cratic political system and civilized social order.
Ideational prerequisites offer a modern solution to the old
constitutional dilemma of whose valies may be taught in the pub-
355 Richard B. Bilder, Integrating International Human Rights Law into Domestic Law -
U.S. Experience, 4 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 1, 2, 7 (1981); Christenson, supra note 293, at 4, 15-
18, 36; Hans A. Linde, Comments, 18 INr'L LAw. 77, 77-78, 80-81 (1984); Bert B.
Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-1955,
69 IOWA L. REv. 901, 902, 916, 932, 936, 948-49 (1984); Robert J. Martineau, Jr., Interpret-
ing the Constitution: The Use of International Human Rights Norms, 5 HuM. RTs. Q. 87, 103,
105-07 (1983).
356 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
357 Id. at 649-50, 673 (1948) (Black, J., Dougl s, J., Murphy, J., & Rutledge, J., con-
curring). See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(relying upon, among other things, the standards of other nations prohibiting the execu-
tion of a person who was a minor at the time of his or her offense); Justice Harry
Blackmun, supra note 293, at 8-9 (stating. that "[international human rights conven-
tions . . . have created for nations mutual obligations that are accepted throughout the
world" and that "I look forward to the day when the Supreme Court, too, will inform its
opinions almost all the time with a decent respect to the opinions of mankind").
358 Lillich, supra note 321, at 411-12. See also Martineau, supra note 355, at 107
(maintaining that "[tihe [informing] approach is free from the concerns . . . of deter-
mining whether international norms are so widely accepted as to be deemed binding on
the court"); cf Bilder, supra note 355, at 7 (asserting that the judiciary will use interna-
tional standards to inform the Constitution even though they are not regarded "as cus-
tomary law to be considered as 'the law of the land'"). But see Christenson, supra note
293, at 17 (remarking that "[tihese [international human rights] norms supply a context,
guide interpretation, and fill gaps in the positive law, but their use requires convincing
technical presentation of the positive sources of customary international law before they
are contextually persuasive").
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lic schools without violating First Amendment precepts. The
schools may inculcate ideational prerequisites whether everyone
agrees with them or not. In effect, the Fraser/Kuhlneier standard
gives ideational prerequisites the imprimatur of constitutionality
under the Free Speech Clause, because they are the values that
will prepare citizens to perpetuate a democratic political system
and civilized social order, in the context of intensified internation-
al interdepence and technologically induced dangers.
The answer to the constitutional question offers the public
schools a way out of the pedagogical dilemma. As a constitutional
matter, the schools are not forced to avoid preferred values incul-
cation; they are not consigned to rely exclusively upon pedagogi-
cally less effective approaches such as values clarification or cogni-
tive moral development. Instead, public school educators may use
optimal pedagogical techniques to transmit ideational prerequisites
secure in the knowledge that there will be no likely legal repercus-
sions. It is true, of course, that even after Fraser and Kuhlmeier,
public schools may not go to extremes in selecting the means to
inculcate this core of transcending values. Implicit in Kuhlmeier is
the thought that the means of inculcation, as well as the values
inculcated, should be reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogi-
cal concern."5 9 Presumably, in light of the precedents, a com-
pelled flag. salute would not be a constitutional means of incul-
cating even ideational prerequisites."W But since Fraser and
Kuhlmeier make plain that inculcation, as a technique, is not for-
bidden by the Free Speech Clause, it may be anticipated with
some confidence that reasoned inculcation, where a full explora-
tion and explanation of the preferred status of the ideational
prerequisite is offered, should pass constitutional muster. Indeed,
there is a paradox in this proposal that may hearten the most
uncompromising civil libertarians. Because the inculcation urged
here is predicated on exploration, and explanation, as well as ex-
359 "[W]e hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising edi-
torial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns." Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). In Kuhlmeier, edi-
torial control, through excision of articles from the school newspaper, was the means se-
lected to inculcate values. Therefore, in upholding the school's conduct the Court was
not only upholding the principle that public schools may inculcate values different from
those conveyed by the offending student expression, but also that the means selected to
that end were acceptable as well.
360 Id. at 273. West Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking
down a compelled flag salute as unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause).
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pression of a preference, children would still be exposed to a
range of viewpoints and data. The marketplace of ideas would not
atrophy from nonuse in the public elementary and secondary
schools but would simply be transformed into a means furthering
constitutional inculcative ends. 6'
As history unfolds, technology advances and human intelli-
gence reaches new levels of understanding, both the nature of
particular ideational prerequisites and the sources of these values
may change. Evolving notions of what constitutes a democratic
political system or a civilized social order make some such changes
inevitable. For now, it is hoped that the ideational prerequisites
identified here will serve as the first step in forming a values data
base upon which the schools may draw. Indeed, this Article's main
purpose is not so much to identify particular ideational prereq-
uisites as it is to discover a meaningful standard for ascertaining
which values may be taught at the elementary and secondary levels
within the strictures of the Free Speech Clause. The standard
proposed here, ideational prerequisites to mankind's collective
survival and humanity, is intended to take cognizance of the fact
that our children will someday be called upon to participate in
decision-making that affects every community. The U.S. Constitu-
tion and other domestic laws are sources of at least some ideation-
al prerequisites. Without implying any limitation on the possibility
that there are a multiplicity of sources in which ideational prereq-
uisites exist, this Article offers international human rights law as
an additional repository that has particular credibility and promise.
V. CONCLUSION
When William Wordsworth wrote that "[t]he Child is father of
the Man,"362 he did not merely invoke poetic license to conjure
up a fanciful image at the expense of meaning. While the words
are capable of varying interpretation, the coupling of this image
with his wish for a life of "natural piety" suggests a yearning to
retain in maturity some of the innocence of early childhood. Per-
haps there is implicit in this vision the idea that each child pres-
ents a new opportunity to effectuate a rejuvenation of "Man"-an
361 Robert B. Keiter, Judicial Review of Student First Amendment Claims: Assessing the
Legitimacm-Competency Debate 50 Mo. L. REV. 25, 52-53 (1985). Cf Mitchell, supra note 164,
at 705-06 (proposing that schools inculcate certain fundamental values and provide a
marketplace of ideas with respect to other values).
362 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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opportunity to recast his moral nature for the better and improve
the common lot. Whether or not this was Wordsworth's meaning,
it appears to have been the intent of the U.S. Supreme Court
when, in Fraser and Kuhmeier, the Justices put the public schools
on notice that the Free Speech Clause permits the inculcation of
values that enable the preservation of a democratic political system
and civilized social order. The Court's assumption is that, at a
minimum, moral education must enable, not simply the moral
individual, but the moral society as well. Inculcation of ideational
prerequisites to mankind's collective survival and humanity is con-
sonant with and a means to effectuating this indispensable but
nonetheless noble aspiration.

